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NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN AT 50:
DESPITE CRITICISM, THE ACTUAL MALICE
STANDARD STILL PROVIDES “BREATHING





The year 2014 marks the anniversary of three milestones in Ameri-
can legal history.  Sixty years ago, on May 17, 1954, the Supreme
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education,1 which struck down the
“separate but equal” doctrine and ushered in the modern civil rights
movement.  Ten years later, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1964,2 barring the unequal application of voter registration require-
ments and prohibiting discrimination based upon race, color, religion,
or national origin in public accommodations, public facilities, public
education, the workplace, and by agencies that receive federal funds.
Finally, on March 9, 1964, the Supreme Court handed down New York
Times v. Sullivan,3 an opinion that has profoundly impacted defama-
tion law and First Amendment rights.
* Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP Cleveland, Ohio.  B.A., J.D., University of Missouri -
Columbia; LL.M., Columbia University.
** Professor and Interim Dean, DePaul University College of Law.  B.A., University of Mis-
souri-Kansas City; M.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Columbia University.
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).  For two recent discussions
of the events leading to the Act, see generally TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS
COME:  TWO PRESIDENTS, TWO PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
(2014); and CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY:  THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT (2014).
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  For a brief overview of the background of the case and the opinion,
see LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY:  JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT
TO PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF New York Times v. Sullivan 1–31 (2014); Kermit L. Hall, Justice
Brennan and Cultural History: New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Times, 27 CAL. W. L. REV.
339 (1991); and Paul Horwitz, Institutional Actors in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 48 GA. L.
REV. 809 (2014).
1
2 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1
In 1984, we examined the background and litigation strategies that
led to the Court’s Sullivan decision.4  In the succeeding thirty years, a
number of books have shed new light on the participants, the Court’s
decision, and its progeny.5  Benefiting from a fifty-year perspective,
this article focuses on three interrelated aspects of Sullivan.
First, the case arose out of the emerging civil rights movement of
the late 1950s and early 1960s, and was crucially important to that
struggle.  The lawsuit filed in Montgomery, Alabama in April 1960 by
Lester B. Sullivan6 against the New York Times was part of a broader
strategy by some white Southerners to blunt criticism from the North-
ern press of their often violent reaction to the demands of blacks for
equal rights.
Second, the legal assault on the civil rights movement was a catalyst
for the Supreme Court’s decision to abandon long-standing common
law principles governing defamation.  In their place, the Court
adopted the actual malice standard as the requirement for recovery in
defamation cases brought by public officials.  But, that standard is not
found anywhere in the Constitution.  This Article traces the origins of
the actual malice standard from its state court beginnings.
Finally, this Article evaluates the long-term impact of Sullivan.  The
opinion initially was the subject of high praise for its impact on the law
of libel and on First Amendment rights, and for protecting the news-
paper and the nascent civil rights movement from potentially stifling
damage awards.  Over the years, critics emerged who asserted that
Sullivan needlessly ignored common law standards, that it failed to
stem the tide of large verdicts in libel cases, and that the actual malice
standard operates as a catalyst for the expenditure of even greater
defense costs.  Despite these concerns, the courts and Congress have
applied the actual malice standard not only to the traditional media,
but have expanded its scope to protect freedom of expression in a
variety of areas not contemplated by the Supreme Court in 1964.  The
events of the past fifty years reveal that the actual malice standard has
4. Bruce L. Ottley, John Bruce Lewis & Younghee Jin Ottley, New York Times v. Sullivan: A
Retrospective Examination, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (1984).
5. See, e.g., KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL
RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS (2011); LEVIN & WERMIEL, supra note 3; ANTHONY
LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).  Anthony
Lewis, one of the most compelling and best known commentators on the Sullivan case, died in
2013. Anthony Lewis, 1927–2013: Reporter Brought Law to Life, Elevating Supreme Court News,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2013, at A1.  His 1991 book provided an exhaustive description of the
background of the case and its impact on First Amendment rights. See generally David Cole, On
Anthony Lewis (1927-2013), THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 9, 2013, at 4; Lyle Dennis-
ton, Anthony Lewis: Pioneer in the Court’s Pressroom, 38 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 432 (2013).
6. For a brief biographical sketch of Sullivan, see HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 11–15.
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proven workable in the multifaceted areas in which it has been
adopted.  Most importantly, the standard has provided, and continues
to provide, what the Supreme Court described as “breathing space”7
for a wide variety of communications made in the public interest.
II. NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN:  THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ORIGINS OF THE CASE
A. Introduction
Although the Thirteenth Amendment officially ended slavery in the
United States, the economic, political, and social systems of the South
in the post-Civil War Era ensured little change for African-Ameri-
cans.8  In 1896, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson9 upheld the
constitutionality of state laws requiring racial segregation by creating
the “separate but equal” doctrine.  Although conditions were “sepa-
rate,” they were far from “equal” for blacks in education, housing,
transportation, and all other aspects of life throughout the United
States.10  The Supreme Court began to strike down specific aspects of
segregation in the mid-1940s.11  But, it was not until 1954 in Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown I)12 that the Court held that the “separate
but equal” doctrine, as applied to public education, was
unconstitutional.
7. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
8. The United States in the post-Civil War period and the condition of former slaves are the
focus of DOUGLAS A. BLACKMAN, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008); and ERIC FONER, RECON-
STRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 (Henry Steele Commager & Rich-
ard B. Morris eds., 1988).
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See generally KEITH WELDON MEDLEY, WE AS FREEMEN: PLESSY V.
FERGUSON (2003); PLESSY V. FERGUSON: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (Brook Thomas
ed., 1997).
10. See generally WILLIAMJAMES HULL HOFFER, PLESSY V. FERGUSON: RACE AND INEQUAL-
ITY IN JIM CROW AMERICA (Peter Charles Hoffer & N. E. H. Hull eds., 2012); JERROLD M.
PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW (2002); C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974).
11. In 1946, the Supreme Court held in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), that segrega-
tion on interstate commercial buses violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.  In Shel-
ley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court ruled that judicial enforcement of restrictive racial
covenants on property is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  For an analysis of the decision, see generally RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975) and JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001). The Southern reaction to
Brown is discussed in GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 61–74 (2004).
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Any hope for a rapid end to school segregation was dashed the fol-
lowing year when the Supreme Court revisited Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation (Brown II).13  In that decision, the Court held that local school
authorities had the primary responsibility of devising solutions for im-
plementing the principles of Brown I.  Chief Justice Earl Warren,14
writing for the Court, noted that “because of their proximity to local
conditions,” courts that initially heard school desegregation cases
were in a position to determine whether school authorities were acting
in good faith to implement the principles of Brown I.15  He ordered
the lower courts to take steps to “admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these
cases.”16  But, Chief Justice Warren also permitted the lower courts to
take into account a “variety of obstacles” to the elimination of segre-
gation, such as administration, the physical condition of schools, trans-
portation, personnel, and revision of school districts and local laws,
and to grant additional time if necessary.17
After Brown I and II, many African-Americans were unwilling to
wait for their rights to be implemented “with all deliberate speed.”18
Instead, they challenged not only school segregation, but also every
aspect of racial discrimination.  Anthony Lewis pointed out that, al-
though it was a fact of life in all parts of the United States, segregation
during the 1950s
was different in the South, and far more virulent, because it had the
force of law.  State law condemned blacks to a submerged status
from cradle to grave, literally.  The law segregated hospitals and
cemeteries.  It confined black children to separate and grossly infer-
ior public schools.  Policemen enforced rules that made blacks ride
in the back of the bus and excluded them from most hotels and
restaurants.  And blacks had little or no voice in making the law, for
in much of the South they were denied the right to vote.19
The majority of white southerners, however, viewed segregation as a
natural part of the “Southern way of life.”20  Believing that African-
13. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).  The decision is discussed in MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW
TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2006).
14. For a discussion of Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Brown II, see ED CRAY, CHIEF JUS-
TICE:  A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 293–300 (1997); and JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL:
EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE (2006).
15. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299.
16. Id. at 301.
17. Id. at 300–01.
18. Id. at 301.
19. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 15–16.
20. STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL 53 (1988).
For a discussion of the “Southern way of life” in Montgomery, Alabama at the time the Sullivan
case was filed in 1960, see HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 5–15.
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Americans would not, on their own, challenge the system, they
blamed the boycotts and demonstrations on Communists, “outside ag-
itators,” and the Northern press.21
Much has been written not only about the civil rights movement in
the 1950s and 1960s,22 but also about the relationship between that
struggle and the media.  Scholars have examined how newspapers,
magazines, and individual journalists reported on the South, its at-
tempts to cling to segregation, and on the sometimes violent reaction
to those efforts.23  Because television came of age during the 1950s,
studies also have focused on its role in shaping attitudes toward race
relations and the civil rights movement by bringing the demonstra-
tions and attacks on marchers into peoples’ living rooms.24  The media
not only reported, but also interpreted, the events of the civil rights
struggle.  And, the members of the media became targets of attempts
to intimidate and silence them.  Lester Sullivan’s 1960 defamation
suit, which ultimately became New York Times v. Sullivan, is only one
example of the responses by the Southern press, officials, and private
individuals to media reports on such events in the South.  Those re-
sponses ranged from criticism of the Northern press for bias and un-
fairness,25 to threats and violence against reporters and
21. For examples of these accusations, see ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 12, at 68–69,
194, 212, 216 (2006); WHITFIELD, supra note 20, at 36; Andrew S. Moore, Anti-Catholicism, Anti-
Protestantism, and Race in Civil Rights Era Alabama and Georgia, J. S. RELIGION (2005), http://
jsr.fsu.edu/Volume8/Moore.htm.
22. The best examination of the Civil Rights Era is Taylor Branch’s trilogy: TAYLOR BRANCH,
PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954–1963 (1988) [hereinafter BRANCH,
PARTING THE WATERS]; TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS,
1963–1965 (1998) [hereinafter BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE]; and TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S
EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1965–1968 (2006). See also 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, The
Civil Rights Revolution, in WE THE PEOPLE (2014); HENRY HAMPTON ET AL., VOICES OF FREE-
DOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE
1980S (1990).
23. See, e.g., SIMEON BOOKER & CAROL MCCABE BOOKER, SHOCKING THE CONSCIENCE:  A
REPORTER’S ACCOUNT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2013) ; DAVID R. DAVIES, THE POST-
WAR DECLINE OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS, 1945–1965, at 63–76 (2006); THE PRESS AND RACE:
MISSISSIPPI JOURNALISTS CONFRONT THE MOVEMENT (David R. Davies ed., 2001); ROBERTS &
KLIBANOFF, supra note 12, at 62–74; Craig Flournoy, Reporting the Movement in Black and
White: The Emmett Till Lynching and the Montgomery Bus Boycott (Aug. 2003) (unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation) (on file with Louisiana State University), available at http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/
available/etd-0611103-164757/unrestricted/Flournoy_dis.pdf.
24. See generally ANIKO BODROGHKOZY, EQUAL TIME:  TELEVISION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (2012); SASHA TORRES, BLACK, WHITE, AND IN COLOR:  TELEVISION AND BLACK
CIVIL RIGHTS (2003); William G. Thomas III, Television News and the Civil Rights Struggle:  The
Views in Virginia and Mississippi, S. SPACES (Nov. 3, 2004), http://www.southernspaces.org/2004/
television-news-and-civil-rights-struggle-views-virginia-and-mississippi.
25. See ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 12, at 211–21; see also WHITFIELD, supra note 20,
at 60–61; William P. Hustwit, From Caste to Color Blindness: James J. Kilpatrick’s Segregationist
Semantics, 77 J. S. HIST. 639–70 (2011).
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photographers,26 to the filing of criminal indictments and civil lawsuits
against journalists and newspapers.27
B. The Background to a Civil Rights Case
By March 1960, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had become one of the
leaders of the rapidly growing civil rights movement.28  Dr. King came
to national prominence when, as president of the Montgomery Im-
provement Association, he led the campaign to desegregate the Mont-
gomery city buses in 1956.29  As the president of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, he quickly rose to the forefront of
the nonviolent struggle for civil rights in the South.  Dr. King became
the target of violence and harassment.  His home was subjected to
both bomb and gunshot attacks.30  In 1956, Dr. King was convicted of
violating the Alabama criminal boycott statute because of his efforts
in desegregating the Montgomery buses.31  That same year he was also
arrested for speeding; two years later, he was arrested for loitering.32
In February 1960, Dr. King again was arrested after he became the
first person in Alabama history to be charged with felony tax evasion.
The government alleged that King perjured himself by signing his
1956 and 1958 Alabama state tax returns.33  After the arrest, the
“Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Free-
dom in the South” was formed in New York, and on March 29, 1960,
26. For a discussion of the threats and attacks on reporters and photographers covering the
attempt to integrate Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas in September 1957 and the
freedom rides in Alabama in May 1960, see ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 12, at 168–70,
176–79, 242–55.
27. See generally LEWIS, supra note 5, at 34–45.
28. For biographies detailing Dr. King’s role in the civil rights movement, see generally
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 22; DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS
(1986); THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (Clayborn Carson ed., 1998); and
STEPHEN B. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND (1982).
29. There are a variety of accounts of the Montgomery bus boycott. See generally BRANCH,
PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 22, at 143–205; KENNETH M. HARE & JIM EARNHARDT,
THEY WALKED TO FREEDOM 1955–1956: THE STORY OF THE MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT
(2005); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY
(1958); JO ANN ROBINSON, THE MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT AND THE WOMAN WHO STARTED
IT (David J. Garrow ed., 1987); DONNIE WILLIAMS WITH WAYNE GREENSHAW, THE THUNDER
OF ANGELS: THE MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT AND THE PEOPLE WHO BROKE THE BACK OF
JIM CROW (2006).
30. The January 30, 1956 bombing of Dr. King’s home is discussed in BRANCH, PARTING THE
WATERS, supra note 22, at 164–67.
31. Id. at 184.
32. Id. at 160–61, 239–42.
33. Id. at 276–77, 282. In May 1960, after a week-long trial in Montgomery, Alabama, Dr.
King was found not guilty of tax evasion by an all-white jury. Id. at 293–311.
2014] NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN AT 50 7
the Committee placed an appeal for funds in a full-page advertise-
ment in the New York Times entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices.”34
The first paragraph of that advertisement described the actions and
goals of “Southern Negro students” demonstrating “in positive affir-
mation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.”35  It charged that these students
were “being met by an unprecedented wave of terror.”36 The second
paragraph claimed that when 400 students tried to integrate lunch
counters in Orangeburg, South Carolina, they were forcibly ejected,
tear-gassed, arrested en masse, and herded into an open barbed-wire
stockade.  The third paragraph in the advertisement declared:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang “My Country ‘Tis
of Thee” on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled
from school, and truckloads of police armed with shot-guns and
tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the en-
tire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-
register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve
them into submission.37
The fourth paragraph spoke of student activity in “Tallahassee, At-
lanta, Nashville, Savannah, Greensboro, Memphis, Richmond, Char-
lotte and a host of other cities in the South,” referring to the students
as “protagonists of democracy.”38  The fifth paragraph praised Dr.
King as a symbol and inspiration to the civil rights movement and
stated that the “Southern violators of the Constitution”39 were deter-
mined to destroy him.  The sixth paragraph stated:
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King’s
peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have
bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have as-
saulted his person. They have arrested him seven times—for
“speeding,” “loitering,” and similar “offenses.”  And now they have
charged him with “perjury”—a felony under which they could im-
prison him for ten years.40
The remaining four paragraphs called upon “men and women of
good will” to add their “moral support” and “material help . . . [to]
34. Advertisement, Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25, [hereinafter
Heed Their Rising Voices], reprinted in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292–93 (1964).
For a discussion of the advertisement, see HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 15–22; and LEWIS,
supra note 5, at 5–8.
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those who are taking the risks, facing jail, and even death in a glorious
re-affirmation of our Constitution and its Bill of Rights.”41  The names
of the sixty-four persons who comprised the “Committee to Defend
Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South” ap-
peared directly below the text of the appeal.42  The list included the
names of A. Philip Randolph, Eleanor Roosevelt, Ertha Kitt, Norman
Thomas, Marlon Brando, Harry Belafonte, labor leader Peter Ottley,
and (now Congressman) John Lewis.43  Below those names was the
statement: “We in the South who are struggling daily for dignity and
freedom warmly endorse this appeal.”44 Below that statement was a
list of twenty other people, primarily ministers who lived and worked
in the South.45  Among the names were four Alabama residents:
Ralph Abernathy, Fred Shuttlesworth, S. S. Seay, Sr., and J. E.
Lowery.46
On April 12, 1960, the New York Times published a front-page arti-
cle written by Harrison Salisbury entitled “Fear and Hatred Grip Bir-
mingham.”47  In that article, Salisbury reported that, as a result of the
climate of racial fear in Birmingham, blacks and whites were afraid to
talk freely, telephones were tapped, mail was opened (and some not
delivered), and watchmen stood guard at black churches and Jewish
temples.48  Salisbury quoted blacks, who called Birmingham “the Jo-
hannesburg of America.”49  The only person specifically named in the
article was the Birmingham police commissioner, Eugene “Bull” Con-
ner, to whom a number of unfavorable quotes were attributed.50  Con-





46. Id.  See generally John K. Wilson, Interview with Rev. Joseph Lowery, 50 Years After New
York Times v. Sullivan, ACADEME BLOG (Mar. 8, 2014), http://academeblog.org/2014/03/08/inter
view-with-rev-joseph-lowery-50-years-after-new-york-times-v-sullivan/.
47. Harrison E. Salisbury, Fear and Hatred Grip Birmingham, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1960
[hereinafter Salisbury, Fear and Hatred], at 1, reprinted in New York Times v. Conner, 365 F.2d
577 app. at 577–80 (5th Cir. 1966). A second article by Salisbury was published on April 13, 1960.
Harrison E. Salisbury, Race Issue Shakes Alabama Structure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1960, at 1.
For an account of the April 12 article concerning Eugene Conner, see BENJAMIN MUSE, TEN
YEARS OF PRELUDE:  THE STORY OF INTEGRATION SINCE THE COURT’S 1954 DECISION 261–63
(1964). The case law reflects some apparent confusion regarding the spelling of the name “Con-
ner.” In some cases it is spelled “Conner” while in others it is spelled “Connor.” In order to
avoid confusion, this article will use the former spelling.
48. Salisbury, Fear and Hatred, supra note 47, at 28.
49. Id.
50. The Salisbury article made the following statements about Eugene Conner:
By Birmingham custom, persons charged with vagrancy are not admitted to bail.
They are held incommunicado for three days. In actual practice, such a prisoner is
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ner filed a civil lawsuit for libel against Salisbury and the New York
Times51 and a grand jury in Bessemar, Alabama, indicted Salisbury on
forty-two counts of criminal libel.52
On April 8, 1960, the three city commissioners of Montgomery indi-
vidually wrote to the Times and to the four Alabama ministers de-
manding a retraction of the statements contained in the March 29
advertisement.53  Counsel for the Times assured them that the asser-
tions were being checked and asked for further explanation as to why
the commissioners believed the statements applied to them.54  The
city commissioners did not reply; instead, on April 19, they filed the
first of a series of civil lawsuits in federal and state courts in Alabama
against the Times, the four Alabama minsters, the Reverend King,
and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS).
To the Southern officials, these suits against the Times were a
means of striking back at and silencing the outside criticism and pres-
sometimes permitted to make one telephone call.  But not always.  A person arrested
on a vagrancy warrant simply disappears for three days. His friends and family may not
know what has happened to him.
This is a favorite technique of Birmingham’s Police Commissioner, Eugene Conner.
Mr. Conner is a former sports broadcaster known as “Bull” because of the timbre of his
voice. He served as Birmingham Police Commissioner for sixteen years in the late
Nineteen Thirties and Nineteen Fourties.  His administration was a stormy one.
He went into eclipse for several years but made a comeback in 1958, running on a
platform of race hate.
Id.
51. Conner sought $3,150,000 from the New York Times and $1,500,000 from Salisbury.
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 22.
52. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 32.  If convicted, Salisbury faced the possibility of
twenty-one years in prison. Id.
53. For Sullivan’s letters to the New York Times and the four Alabama ministers, see Letter
from L. B. Sullivan et al., Commissioner of Public Affairs, City of Montgomery, Alabama, to
The New York Times Co. (Mar. 8, 1960), reprinted in Record from the Circuit Court of Mont-
gomery County, Alabama at 1949, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Record
Press Printers 1963) [hereinafter Sullivan Record]; Letter from L. B. Sullivan, Commissioner of
Public Affairs, City of Montgomery, Alabama, to Ralph D. Abernathy, minister (Mar. 8, 1960),
reprinted in Sullivan Record at 1962; Letter from L. B. Sullivan, Commissioner of Public Affairs,
City of Montgomery, Alabama, to S. S. Seay, minister (Mar. 8, 1960), reprinted in Sullivan Re-
cord at 1964; Letter from L. B. Sullivan, Commissioner of Public Affairs, City of Montgomery,
Alabama, to J. E. Lowery, minister (Mar. 8, 1960), reprinted in Sullivan Record at 1965 and;
Letter from L. B. Sullivan, Commissioner of Public Affairs, City of Montgomery Alabama, to
Fred L. Shuttlesworth, minister (Mar. 8 1960), reprinted in Sullivan Record at 1967.
54. The letter stated in part:
We have been investigating the matter and are somewhat puzzled as to how you think
the statements in any way reflect on you.  So far, our investigation would seem to indi-
cate that the statements are substantially correct with the sole exception that we find no
justification for the statement that the dining hall in the State College was “padlocked
in an attempt to starve them into submission.”
Letter from Lord, Day & Lord, counsel for New York Times, to L.B. Sullivan, Commissioner of
Public Affairs, City of Montgomery, Alabama, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 1951.
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sure for change mounting against the South.55  To many white
southerners, the civil rights movement was viewed as part of a Com-
munist-inspired conspiracy.56  Articles and advertisements such as
those published in the Times in the early months of 1960 confirmed
the view that outside agitation was the source of these disturbances.
The stakes involved on both sides of the litigation in Sullivan were
very high.  The city commissioners saw themselves as representatives
of the South and believed that their power, position, and way of life
were under attack.  If they won, newspapers would hesitate to publish
critical articles out of fear of potential libel suits.  Indeed, an editorial
in the Montgomery Advertiser on May 22, 1960 stated: “The Adver-
tiser has no doubt that the recent checkmating of the Times in Ala-
bama will impose a restraint upon other publications which have
hitherto printed about the South what was supposed to be.”57  They
hoped that their suits would create a serious obstacle to those de-
manding further change.  If they lost, the press would be free to circu-
late critical articles, inevitably increasing the pressure for change.
The issues at stake for the Times were broader than simply its de-
fense of a libel action.  If it lost, there was not only the threat of a
sizeable judgment,58 but the media’s ability to criticize government of-
ficials would be severely hampered.59 This issue was later converted
55. See The Abolitionist Hellmouths, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Apr. 17, 1960, reprinted in
Sullivan Record at 2013; see also LEWIS, supra note 5, at 34–45; E. L. Holland Jr., “The Big Lie”
Editor—Wonders Where The New York Times Got Its News, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Apr.
15, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2008.
56. MUSE, supra note 47, at 40.  For Dr. King’s response to charges that the civil rights move-
ment was led by communists, see OATES, supra note 28, at 94.
57. Commentary, Fall-Out from Ad Error, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 22, 1960, re-
printed in Sullivan Record at 2025.
58. See Horwitz, supra note 3, at 36.  The total amount of damages sought by the plaintiffs
from the Times was $6,100,000. See infra note 59.  The lawsuits against CBS sought $1,700,000.
See infra note 59.
59. A general description of the various libel suits that were brought can be found in HALL &
UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 31–33.  In addition to the four suits filed in Alabama state courts,
seven suits were filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in
Birmingham.  On May 7, 1960, the three city commissioners of Birmingham, James W. Morgan,
Eugene Conner, and J. T. Waggoner, individually filed suit against the New York Times and
reporter Harrison Salisbury seeking $500,000 in damages resulting from a series of April 1960
articles written by Salisbury and appearing in the Times about the racial tension in Birmingham.
See Suits Filed Against Times, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 7, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan
Record at 2026. On May 27, 1961, the three city commissioners of Bessemar, Jess Lanier, Ray-
mond Parsons, and Herman Thompson, each filed similar suits seeking damages of $500,000.  See
News Item, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, June 1, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2035; see
also 3 Officials of Birmingham File Times Suit, ALA. J., May 31, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Re-
cord at 2159.  On July 20, 1960, a Birmingham detective, Joe Lindsey, filed suit against the same
defendants for $100,000. See Detective’s Suit Charges Times, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, July
20, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2041; see also Birmingham Officer Sues N.Y. Times,
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into a constitutional argument that, despite the state’s interest in pro-
tecting libeled individuals, the threat of a libel suit in such cases might
constitute an infringement of First Amendment rights.60
III. NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN:  THE COURT DECISIONS
A. Sullivan v. New York Times
On April 19, 1960, the three city commissioners of Montgomery,
Alabama  filed suit individually in the Montgomery County Circuit
Court against the New York Times, Ralph Abernathy, Fred Shuttles-
worth, S. S. Seay, Sr., and J. E. Lowery.61  They each sought $500,000
in damages against the defendants.62  The identical complaints were
based on alleged defamatory statements in the third and sixth
paragraphs of the advertisement that had appeared in the Times on
March 29, 1960.63
The jury trial in Sullivan v. New York Times began on November 1,
1960 and lasted three days.64  Neither the courtroom environment nor
the comments in local newspapers were favorable to the Times or the
ALA. J., July 20, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2168.  Finally, five libel suits were brought
against CBS for its coverage of the March 29 advertisement and Salisbury’s April 12 article in
the New York Times. Three of those suits, each seeking $500,000 in damages, were filed by the
Birmingham city commissioners in federal district court in Birmingham. See Suits Filed Against
Times, supra, at 2026.
60. This argument was made by the New York Times both in the suit brought by Conner, New
York Times Co. v. Conner, 291 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1961), and in the action by Sullivan, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 263 (1964).
61. See Arthur Osgoode, Commissioners Sue Newspaper, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Apr.
20, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2003; see also City Officials Sue N.Y. Times, ALA. J.,
Apr. 20, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2141.  Throughout the litigation, the three city
commissioners were represented by the Montgomery law firm of Steiner, Crum & Baker. See
Transcript of Proceedings, Sullivan v. New York Times Co., No. 27416 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1960) re-
printed in Sullivan Record at 567. The Times was represented by its New York counsel, the firm
of Lord, Day & Lord, which counted among its members former U.S. Attorney General Herbert
Brownell and William P. Rogers. Id. at 567, 570.  Although the Times had difficulty in finding
local counsel in Alabama, it was ultimately represented by a Birmingham firm, Beddow, Embry
& Beddow, which was a prominent criminal defense firm. Id. at 568; see also Times Challenges
Libel Suit Here New York, Newspaper Retains B’ham Firm of Bedlow, Embry, Beddow As
Counsel, ALA. J., May 20, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2156 (newspaper account of the
Time’s retention of Birmingham counsel).  Eric Embry, who represented the Times before the
Alabama courts, was later appointed to the Alabama Supreme Court.  E. R. Shipp, T. Eric Em-
bry, Defense Lawyer in Historic Libel Case, Dies at 70, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992, at B6.
62. Osgoode, supra note 61.
63. City Officials Sue N.Y. Times, supra note 61.
64. For a transcript of the jury trial in Sullivan, see Transcript of Proceedings, Sullivan v. New
York Times Co., No. 27416 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1960), reprinted in Sullivan Record at 567–862.  For a
discussion of the trial, see Hall, supra note 3, at 353–55; HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 5, at
45–68; and LEWIS, supra note 5, at 23–33.
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four ministers.  The case was tried before Judge Walter B. Jones and
an all-white jury from Montgomery County.65
Judge Jones made his feelings on segregation and his beliefs con-
cerning the Constitution clear in a statement from the bench in a com-
panion case to Sullivan. In the action brought by Montgomery Mayor
Earl James against the Times and the four ministers based on the
March 29 advertisement, Judge Jones stated in open court: “[T]here
will be no integrated seating in this courtroom.  Spectators will be
seated in this courtroom according to their race, and this is for the
orderly administration of justice and the good of all people coming
here lawfully.”66  He then turned his thoughts to the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Much has been said at the Bar, and out of the hearing of the trial
jury, as to the supposed requirements of the XIV Amendment di-
recting the Trial Judge of the Court of a sovereign state how he will
conduct a trial before a jury in the courts of Alabama.
I would like to say for those here present, and for those who may
come here to litigate in the future, that the XIV Amendment has no
standing whatsoever in this Court, it is a pariah and an outcast, if it
be construed to hold and direct the Presiding Judge of this Court as
to the manner in which proceedings in the Court . . . shall be
conducted.
. . . .
We will now continue with the trial of this case under the laws of
the State of Alabama, and not under the XIV Amendment, and in
the belief and knowledge that the white man’s justice . . . will give
65. The case was tried to a jury of twelve white men. Lawyers Clash at Times Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1960, at 33.  Two black members of the panel were stricken by Sullivan’s counsel.
Id.  The courtroom atmosphere became an issue as the trial progressed and was raised again in
the appeals filed by the four ministers and in their briefs and arguments before the United States
Supreme Court.  Brief for the Petitioners, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), reprinted
in Sullivan Record at 52–62.  The black ministers argued that their rights to equal protection,
due process, and a fair and impartial trial under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated.
The local media focused its attention on the jurors.  Photographers in the courtroom took pic-
tures of all the jurors for Montgomery’s two local newspapers, and television cameras followed
the jurors to the door of the jury room. The photographs of the jurors, published in the Alabama
Journal, are reprinted in the Sullivan Record at 951.  See also Transcript of Proceedings on De-
fendant’s Motion for New Trial, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 889–90 (offering photographs
into evidence during hearing on motion for new trial).  The Montgomery newspapers printed the
names of the jurors; one paper reported the names on its front page. Jurors Selected For Times
Suit, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Nov. 1, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2079–80.
66. Walter B. Jones, Judge, Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Statement Made from the
Bench During Sullivan v. New York Times Co., No. 27416 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1960), in 22 ALA. LAW-
YER 190, 190–91 (1961) (entitled Judge Jones on Court Room Segregation); see also Judith
Rushin, Courtroom Segregated in Times Suit, ALA. J., Feb. 1, 1961, reprinted in Sullivan Record
at 2213.
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the parties at the Bar of this Court, regardless of race or color, equal
justice under law.67
Judge Jones’s sentiments also were apparent from the manner in
which he addressed the various trial lawyers.  When he questioned
prospective jurors concerning their knowledge of, or relationship with,
the attorneys trying the case, he referred to the attorneys for Sullivan
and the Times as “mister,” but dispensed with this title when he made
reference to the ministers’ black lawyers.68  The Judge spoke of the
black attorneys as “Fred Gray of Montgomery” or “V. Z. Crawford of
Mobile.”69  The trial transcript further reflects different forms of iden-
tification for the lawyers, with the black attorneys referred to as
“Lawyer Gray” or “Lawyer Crawford,” while the white attorneys
were referred to as “mister.”70
Newspaper articles, which were critical of the defendants and of the
March 29 advertisement in the Times, appeared in local papers prior
to and during the trial of the case.71  In an April 9, 1960 article entitled
“Not The First Lie About [the] South,” the Alabama Journal declared:
It must be very disappointing to regular readers of the New York
Times, one of the world’s really great newspapers, to find it has
been willing to lend its columns for such a page of falsehood as that
published the other day and signed by money-beggars who want to
defend such a despicable character as Martin Luther King in the
courts and save him from the penalties of his derelictions.72
The April 18, 1960 edition of the same paper was even stronger re-
garding the advertisement.  It stated:
[The New York Times’] full page advertisement signed by Eleanor
Roosevelt, Ralph Abernathy et al[.], to raise $200,000 for M. L.
67. Jones, supra note 66, at 191–92.
68. Transcript of Proceedings, Sullivan v. New York Times Co., No. 27416 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1960),
reprinted in Sullivan Record at 568.
69. Id.
70. Id. passim. On one occasion, Sullivan’s counsel, while reading a portion of the March 29
advertisement, mispronounced the word “negro” as “nigra” and “nigger” in the presence of the
jury and without admonition by the court. Id. at 578–80.  Furthermore, in his summation, Sulli-
van’s counsel declared: “In other words, all of these things that happened did not happen in
Russia where the police run everything, they did not happen in the Congo where they still eat
them, they happened in Montgomery, Alabama, a law-abiding community.” Id. at 930 (emphasis
added).  Again, Judge Jones made no rebuke for that statement.
71. Among the critical editorials were: The Abolitionist Hellmouths, supra note 55; Birming-
ham Statements Published in the Times, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 4, 1960, reprinted in
Sullivan Record at 2023; Holland, supra note 55; Not the First Lie About South, ALA. J., Apr. 9,
1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2134; (Reply to N. Y. Times) Not a City of Race Terror,
ALA. J., Apr. 22, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2145; The Times and Salisbury, ALA. J.,
May 7, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2151; Will They Purge Themselves?, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Apr. 7, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2127.
72. Not the First Lie About South, supra note 71.
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King to defend himself against income tax fraud in Alabama is a
pack of lies from beginning to end. Without some sinister purpose,
no newspaper would print such libelous and scandalous material
without confirming its contents.73
On September 25, 1960, a writer for the Montgomery Advertiser ex-
pressed sentiments that must have referred to the Times when he re-
ported:  “State and City authorities have found a formidable legal
bludgeon to swing at out-of-state newspapers whose reporters cover
racial incidents in Alabama.”74
The basis of Sullivan’s claim was that the third and sixth paragraphs
of the March 29 advertisement “Heed Their Rising Voices” were de-
famatory to him.75  As to the third paragraph, dealing with a series of
events which occurred at Alabama State College, Sullivan introduced
evidence to show that (1) although police were stationed near the
campus on three occasions, they did not “ring” the campus; (2) stu-
dent leaders were not expelled for singing on the Capitol steps but
rather for their participation in lunch counter sit-ins; (3) less than the
“entire student body” protested by not reregistering; and (4) the din-
ing hall had not been padlocked in an effort to starve the students into
submission.76  Sullivan also contended that the sixth paragraph was
defamatory because Dr. King had been arrested four times instead of
seven, and because the police were not responsible for the assaults or
bombings against Dr. King.77
Sullivan also presented testimony that the statements at issue re-
ferred to him specifically.78  He called six witnesses who testified that
the actions described in the two paragraphs would tend to be associ-
ated with the city commissioners generally and with Sullivan in partic-
73. Unworthy Newspaper Policy, ALA. J., Apr. 18, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2139.
74. Rex Thomas, State Finds Formidable Legal Club To Swing at Out-of-State Press, MONT-
GOMERY ADVERTISER, Sept. 25, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2064.
75. See Times Libel Suit Opens Here Today, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Nov. 1, 1960, re-
printed in Sullivan Record at 2077.
76. Judith Rushin, L. B. Sullivan Testifies in Times Suit, ALA. J., Nov. 2, 1960, reprinted in
Sullivan Record at 2203.
77. Id.
78. The basis of Sullivan’s claim was the “feeling” that the advertisement “reflects not only on
me but on the other Commissioners and the community.”  Transcript of Proceedings, Sullivan v.
New York Times Co., No. 27416 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1960), reprinted in Sullivan Record at 724. Sulli-
van felt that the statements referring to “police activities” or “police action” were associated
with him, impugned his “ability and integrity,” and reflected on him “as an individual.” Id. at
712, 713, 724.  He also claimed that the statements in the advertisement, which alluded to the
bombing of Dr. King’s home, referred to the commissioners, to the police department, and to
him because they were contained in the same paragraph as the statements mentioning police
activities. Id. at 717–18.
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ular.79  The six witnesses testified that if they had believed the
statements in the advertisement regarding the police department’s ac-
tions, they would have thought that Sullivan was improperly carrying
out the duties of his office and would have believed that the police
were guilty of serious misbehavior.80  Not one of the six witnesses,
however, testified that he believed the advertisement.
The Times based its defense on three arguments.  First, because
neither Sullivan nor any of the Montgomery city commissioners were
mentioned by name, Sullivan had not met his burden of proving that
the advertisement paragraphs were “of or concerning” him.81  Second,
although Sullivan had the responsibility of supervising the Montgom-
ery Police Department, he was normally not responsible for the day-
to-day operations of the department, including those during the dem-
onstrations at Alabama State College.82  Because all of these opera-
tions were under the supervision of the Montgomery Chief of Police,
Sullivan did not show that the advertisement charged him with any
official misconduct.83  Finally, even if the jury found that the allegedly
defamatory matter referred to Sullivan, the Times maintained that it
did not publish the advertisement maliciously and thus was not
liable.84
Although joined as co-defendants with the Times, the defense strat-
egy of each of the four Alabama ministers was to separate himself
from the substantive question of whether the advertisement was de-
famatory.  Leaving that issue to the Times, the ministers completely
disassociated themselves from the advertisement by maintaining that
they did not sign it, were not members of the committee that pub-
lished it, were never approached by the committee for permission to
use their names, and did not even know that the advertisement was
being published.85
79. Id. at 602–52; see also Arthur Osgoode, Witnesses Say Ad Reflected on Sullivan, MONT-
GOMERY ADVERTISER, Nov. 2, 1960, reprinted in Sullivan Record at 2081. The witnesses called
by Sullivan were Grover C. Hall, the editor of the Montgomery Advertiser; Arnold D. Blackwell,
a member of the Water Works Board appointed by the commissioner and a businessman en-
gaged in real estate and insurance; Harry W. Kaminsky, the sales manager of a clothing store
and a close friend of Sullivan; H. M. Price, Sr., the owner of a small food equipment business;
William M. Parker, Jr., a service station owner who was a friend of Sullivan; and Horace W.
White, the owner of a trucking company and a former employer of Sullivan. Transcript of Pro-
ceedings, surpa note 78, at 602–69.
80. See Osgoode, supra note 79.
81. Given Charges Requested by the Defendant, Sullivan v. New York Times Co., No. 27416
(Ala. Cir. Ct. 1960), reprinted in Sullivan Record at 829–36.
82. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 78, at 703, 720.
83. Given Charges Requested by the Defendant, supra note 81, at 834.
84. Id. at 836.
85. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 82, at 787–804.
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In his charge to the jury, Judge Jones stated that the third and sixth
paragraphs of the advertisement were “libelous per se,”86 and with-
drew from the jury the question of whether the text was defamatory.87
He instructed the jury that “[g]eneral damages need not be alleged or
proved but are presumed,”88 and that Sullivan was entitled to recover
both “presumed” and punitive damages if the jury decided that the
words referred to him.89  Although Judge Jones held that no showing
of actual damages was required, under Alabama law, punitive dam-
ages could not be claimed unless a retraction had been requested and
refused.90  Because Sullivan had written to the Times and the other
defendants requesting a retraction, and because the retraction was not
immediately given, the court allowed the jury to assess punitive
damages.91
After only two hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for
Sullivan in the amount of $500,000.92  The amount was not specified as
either actual or punitive damages.93  The Times immediately filed a
motion for a new trial based on alleged errors made by the trial court
and on the ground that the verdict was excessive and violated the
Constitution.94  In addition, the four ministers claimed that they did
not receive a fair trial and that this violated both the Alabama consti-
tution and the U.S. Constitution.95  Judge Jones denied the Times’ mo-
tion.  Finally, he stated that the four ministers had allowed the time
for their motions for a new trial to lapse, and thus, he could not con-
sider them.96
86. Oral Charge and Exceptions Thereto, Sullivan v. New York Times Co., No. 27416 (Ala.
Cir. Ct. 1960), reprinted in Sullivan Record at 819, 823–24.
87. Id. at 824.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 825.
90. Id. at 821.
91. Id. at 821, 824–26.
92. Final Judgment, Jury and Verdict, Sullivan v. New York Times Co., No. 27416 (Ala. Cir.
Ct. 1960), reprinted in Sullivan Record at 862.
93. Id.
94. Motion of Defendant’s, The New York Times Company, a Corporation, for New Trial,
Sullivan v. New York Times Co., No. 27416 (Ala. Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 1, 1960), reprinted in Sullivan
Record at 896.
95. Motion of Defendant, Ralph D. Abernathy for New Trial, Sullivan v. New York Times
Co., No. 27416 (Ala. Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 2, 1960), reprinted in Sullivan Record at 970.
96. Order of Court Denying Motion of Defendant New York Times Comapny for a New Trial,
Sullivan v. New York Times Co., No. 27416 (Ala. Cir. Ct. entered Mar. 17, 1961), reprinted in
Sullivan Record at 970. In order to stay the execution of the trial court’s judgment to allow for
an appeal to the Alabama Supreme court, the four Alabama ministers were required under
Alabama law to post “supersedeas bonds” of $500,000, which they were financially unable to do.
Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1961).  When the state began levying on their
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B. New York Times v. Sullivan:  The Alabama Supreme Court
When the federal courts declined to review the Montgomery
County Circuit Court decision in Sullivan v. New York Times via a
collateral injunctive action, the only alternative for the Times and the
four Alabama ministers was a direct appeal to the Alabama Supreme
Court.  In August 1962, that court upheld the circuit court as to its
jurisdiction, the merits of the case, and the amount of the damages.97
The Alabama Supreme Court first agreed with the trial court’s
holding that the advertisement was “libelous per se.”98  It then refuted
the Times’ argument that there was insufficient evidence to connect
the statements with Sullivan, stating:
We think it common knowledge that the average person knows that
municipal agents, such as police and firemen, and others, are under
the control and direction of the city governing body, and more par-
ticularly under the direction and control of a single commissioner.
In measuring the performance or deficiencies of such groups, praise
property to satisfy the judgment, the four ministers filed a complaint in federal district court
seeking injunctive relief. Id.  The basis of their motion was 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which provides that
[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any
State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States; (4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3)–(4) (2012). The complaint was directed not only to Sullivan but to the suits
filed by the other city commissioners and the suit brought by Alabama Governor John Patterson.
Abernathy, 295 F.2d at 454–55.  Because the request was for equitable relief, the ministers al-
leged they would suffer irreparable harm and that they had no adequate relief at law. Id.  On
the same day the ministers filed their federal court action, they also moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent the levy upon and sale of their property in satisfaction of the $500,000
judgments. Id. at 455.  District Court Judge Frank Johnson denied the request for the prelimi-
nary injunction on the ground that the ministers had failed to seek any relief from the Circuit
Court of Montgomery County or from any of the defendants. Id. When the defendants then
filed a motion to dismiss the injunction action, Judge Johnson granted it in an unreported deci-
sion. Id. at 456.  The dismissal was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit where Judge Richard Rives, writing for a unanimous court, upheld the dismissal on the
ground that if the plaintiffs felt their constitutional rights were not adequately protected in the
state courts of Alabama, they could appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at
457–58.  Rather than wait for the Alabama Supreme Court to decide their appeal in the Sullivan
case, the ministers sought review of the court of appeals’ dismissal by a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.  Abernathy v. Patterson, 368 U.S. 986 (1962).
The petition was denied without comment. Id.
97. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 52 (Ala. 1962); see also HALL & UROFSKY,
supra note 5, at 83–99.
98. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d at 37.
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or criticism is usually attached to the official in complete control of
the body.99
The court then summarily dismissed the Times’ remaining constitu-
tional arguments on the grounds that “the First Amendment . . . does
not protect libelous publications” and “the Fourteenth Amendment is
directed against State action and not private action.”100
On the question of damages, the court first held that because the
jury found that the words referred to Sullivan, he was entitled to re-
cover without “proof of pecuniary injury[,] . . . such injury being im-
plied.”101  The court also held the amount of damages to be
appropriate because the newspaper “in its own files had articles al-
ready published which would have demonstrated the falsity of the al-
legations in the advertisement.”102  Because the Times did not retract
the statements as to Sullivan when requested to do so, and did not
deny the falsity of the advertisement at the trial, the court concluded
that “the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of
The Times, and its maliciousness inferable therefrom.”103
The Alabama Supreme Court’s rebuke of the Times was not unex-
pected.  However, while the decision went against the Times, it was
tactically favorable because, in upholding the trial court on every
ground, it made a successful challenge in the United States Supreme
Court possible.
C. New York Times v. Sullivan:  The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court that heard and decided the Sullivan case in
early 1964 was both an “activist” court and a divided court.  While
involved in giving an expanded meaning to the Constitution, the
Court was often deeply divided over the role it should play in the
political process.104
99. Id. at 39.
100. Id. at 40.
101. Id. at 41.
102. Id. at 50.
103. Id. at 51.
104. For an analysis of the Warren Court, see generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN
COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); and THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPEC-
TIVE (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993).  Some have labeled the court’s 1963 October term as the “Sec-
ond American Constitutional Convention.” See, e.g., L.A. Powe, Jr., October Term 1963: “The
Second American Constitutional Convention,” 38 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 192, 192 (2013) (citing
Anthony Lewis, The Legacy of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE
398, 398 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996)) (“Anthony Lewis passed Solicitor General Archibald
Cox a note asking ‘How does it feel to be at the second American Constitutional
Convention?’”).
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Philip Kurland, in his foreward to the Harvard Law Review’s sum-
mary of the 1963 Supreme Court term,105 referred to that term as the
climax of “the egalitarian revolution,”106 which was characterized by
equality as a guide for constitutional decisions and a subordination of
the federal system.  The decisions of the Court during that term indi-
cate that it was deeply committed to continuing the revolution.  De-
segregation,107 reapportionment,108 and the first of the “sit-in”
cases109 were all issues that came before the Court during the 1963
term.
Although many of these cases were decided by narrow votes with
vigorous dissents, the members of the Court all agreed on the Sullivan
case.  The Times was represented by Columbia Law School Professor
Herbert Wechsler, the principal draftsman of the petition for certio-
rari and the newspaper’s counsel during oral argument before the
Court.110
On March 9, 1964, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court in both the Sullivan and Ab-
ernathy cases.111  In its decision, the Court not only rejected all of Sul-
livan’s arguments, but it also went beyond what the Times had urged
in its brief and oral argument.
Sullivan’s principal argument, both in his brief and oral argu-
ment,112 had been that the advertisement was not protected by the
First Amendment.  This argument was premised on the narrow
ground that the advertisement was “commercial advertising,” and on
105. Philip B. Kurland, Foreword, Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government. 78 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1964).
106. Id. at 145.
107. See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
108. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
109. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
110. Professor Wechsler’s arguments based on the history of the Sedition Act of 1798 were
“bold” and equated civil damages for injury to individual reputation with criminal punishment
for negative statements about the state. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 118; see also Ottley et al., supra
note 4, at 766–71.  Professor Wechsler went on to be the director of the American Law Institute
and died in 2000.  Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead at 90, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 2000, at C21.  The authors are both former students of Professor Wechsler.
111. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). See generally Anthony Lewis,
The Sullivan Decision, 1 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 135 (2004). Abernathy v. Sullivan, the companion
case to New York Times v. Sullivan, was resolved in a footnote in that case. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
264 n.4.
112. For a discussion of oral argument in the Sullivan case, see BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE,
supra note 22, at 204–08; HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 138–59; and LEWIS, supra note 5, at
127–39.  “If the [J]ustices wanted a reminder of the potential consequences of [Sullivan] as they
gathered for oral arguments, they only had to look out into the audience, where Martin Luther
King Jr. sat among the spectators.” SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIB-
ERAL CHAMPION 222 (2010).
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a broader contention that the First Amendment does not protect li-
bel.113  Justice William Brennan, writing for the Court, rejected both
of these arguments.114  Justice Brennan wrote that the Court did not
consider the advertisement “commercial” in the sense used in Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen,115 a case involving the distribution of handbills
containing a commercial message on one side and a protest against
certain government action on the other.  Here, the Court said the ad-
vertisement in the Times “communicated information, expressed
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought fi-
nancial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objec-
tives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.”116
Although counsel for Sullivan cited numerous cases supporting the
proposition that the First Amendment does not protect libel, the
Court rejected the analogy to these cases because none dealt with “the
use of libel laws to impose sanctions upon expression critical of the
official conduct of public officials.”117  The Court said that it was thus
free of precedent in deciding the question and held that like “the vari-
ous other formulae for the repression of expression that have been
challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations.  It must be measured by standards that sat-
isfy the First Amendment.”118
The Court then looked at the Alabama courts’ application of the
rule of libel to the facts in the case.  After comparing the Alabama law
of criminal libel with its civil counterpart,119 the Court concluded that
the state was trying to use its civil law to exact a punishment forbidden
by its criminal law.120  This, the Court said, violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.  Specifically, the Court articulated an actual
malice standard, stating that
[t]he constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.121
113. Brief for Respondent at 28–38, Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (No. 39).
114. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.  For an analysis of Justice Brennan’s opinion, see HALL &
UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 172–79; and LEWIS, supra note 5, at 140–52.
115. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
116. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.
117. Id. at 268.
118. Id. at 269.
119. Id. at 277–78.
120. Id. at 277.
121. Id. at 279–80.
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It is this actual malice test that has often been considered the basis
of the Court’s criteria for recovery by public officials in defamation
cases.  Although the term actual malice had been used by the Times in
its brief,122 it was used in the sense of actual intent to cause the harm-
ful result.  The Court, however, expanded this meaning to include not
only knowledge of the falsity of the statement, but also “reckless dis-
regard” of the truth.123
Because the Alabama courts had not applied this actual malice test
to the facts, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Alabama
Supreme Court and remanded the case.124  The Court, however, then
took the unusual step of reviewing the facts of the case to determine
whether the evidence would support a libel verdict.  The Court con-
cluded that while the Times might have been negligent in not discov-
ering the misstatements in the advertisement, the evidence was not
sufficient to satisfy the test of actual malice.125  As to the four Ala-
bama ministers, the Court found that even if they had authorized the
use of their names in the advertisement, there was no evidence to
show actual malice on their part.126  Thus, even if Sullivan wished to
pursue the cases again on remand, the Court effectively precluded it
from doing so.
Justice Douglas joined the concurring opinions of Justices Black and
Goldberg, arguing that the majority did not go far enough to provide
adequate protection for critics of official conduct.127  Those three Jus-
tices would have created an absolute privilege, whereas the majority
created a qualified privilege, which could be overcome by proof of
actual malice.  Justice Goldberg, however, would have retained an
area of private life in which public officials would have the benefits of
the ordinary rules of defamation.128
122. Brief for Petitioner at 31, 55, Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (No. 39).
123. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
124. Id. at 292.
125. Id. at 286.
126. Id. Not everyone credits the civil rights movement as the catalyst for the Sullivan deci-
sion.  For example, Bruce Sanford has written,
Some commentators have credited the civil rights movement and the political context
of the case with prompting the Court’s landmark decision.  The observation seems pa-
rochial since scrutiny of Justice Brennan’s opinion . . . reveals that the Justices’ pano-
rama was far broader.  In 1964, the Court could not help but be struck by the
antiquated nature of the common law of defamation and its hopeless inadequacy in
dealing with the semantic excesses of a society undergoing dizzying social, economic
and political change, including, for one thing, desegregation.
BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 1.1, at 1 n.1 (2d ed. Supp. 2012).
127. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
128. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 301–02.
22 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1
IV. THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD:  ITS ORIGINS
In announcing its actual malice standard, the Supreme Court cited
what had previously been the minority rule in the law of defamation
since the nineteenth century.  Before New York Times v. Sullivan was
decided, only ten states129 applied an actual malice test to conditional
or qualified privilege cases—those in which the privilege may be over-
ridden or foreclosed.130
A. The Actual Malice Standard:  A Product of the Common Law
In later years, Justice Brennan would recall that his clerks discov-
ered the opinion’s “actual malice” language,131 but in fact, it was con-
tained in Herbert Wechsler’s brief.132  The Sullivan opinion borrowed
its reasoning for the actual malice test from a 1908 Kansas case, Cole-
man v. MacLennan.133  In Coleman, a state attorney general running
for reelection sued the Topeka State Journal for libel after an article
suggested misconduct by Coleman in connection with a school fund
transaction.134  In finding that the article was privileged, Justice Rous-
seau Burch of the Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that
it is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the
character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages.  The
importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast,
129. Arizona, California, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Hamp-
shire, South Dakota, and West Virginia applied the actual malice test. See, e.g., Connor v.
Timothy, 33 P.2d 293, 295 (Ariz. 1934); Snively v. Record Publ’g Co., 198 P. 1, 5 (Cal. 1921);
Salinger v. Cowles, 191 N.W. 167, 174 (Iowa 1923); Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 292 (Kan.
1908); Lawrence v. Fox, 97 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Mich. 1959); Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 203
N.W. 974, 975 (Minn. 1925); Lafferty v. Houlihan, 121 A. 92, 95 (N.H. 1923); Lewis v. Carr, 101
S.E. 97, 98 (N.C. 1919); McLean v. Merriman, 175 N.W. 878, 880 (S.D. 1920); Bailey v. Charles-
ton Mail Ass’n, 27 S.E.2d 837, 840 (W. Va. 1943).  Four other states recognized a similar privi-
lege, but had not enunciated the standard as clearly: Connecticut, Nebraska, Utah, and Vermont.
See, e.g., Moynahan v. Waterbury Republican, Inc., 102 A. 653, 654 (Conn. 1918); Estelle v. Daily
News Publ’g Co., 164 N.W. 558, 559 (Neb. 1917); Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publ’g Co., 27
P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1933); Posnett v. Marble, 20 A. 813, 814 (Vt. 1890). See generally Deckle Mc-
Lean, Origins of the Actual Malice Test, 62 JOURNALISM Q. 750, 751 (1985).  The author stated:
“The Coleman case . . . is not remarkable among early malice libel cases, and the clarity of the
opinion no greater than that of the earlier Kansas opinion in Balch, or some other early cases.”
Id.; see also State v. Balch, 2 P. 609, 614 (Kan. 1884).  In Balch, the Kansas Supreme Court held
that “[m]alice in such cases need not be hatred or ill will, but any reckless or wanton disposition
to do a wrongful act without excuse of justification.” Balch, 2 P. at 613.
130. See generally 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RE-
LATED PROBLEMS § 9:1 (4th ed. 2014) (Rationale of Qualified Privilege and General Principles).
131. LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 3, at 18 (citing STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 112, at
224).
132. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 122, at 54 n.*.
133. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281 (quoting Coleman, 98 P. at 286); see also LEWIS, supra note 5, at
120.
134. 98 P. at 281.
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and the advantages derived are so great, that they more than coun-
terbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may
be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals
must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may
be great. The public benefit from publicity is so great, and the
chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion
must be privileged.135
However, the meaning of actual malice varied widely before the Sulli-
van opinion.
In Coleman, the Kansas Supreme Court defined “malice” as “evil
mindedness,” which is determined from
an interpretation of the writing, its malignity, or intemperance by
showing recklessness in making the charge, pernicious activity in
circulating or repeating it, its falsity, the situation and relations of
the parties, the facts and circumstances surrounding the publication,
and by other evidence appropriate to a charge of bad motives as in
other cases.136
So, like many courts of that time, the Coleman court generally ex-
tended this privilege only to discussion of the character of candidates
for public office, rather than the broader application to “public offi-
cials” in Sullivan.137  The Coleman court’s actual malice standard138
135. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281 (quoting Coleman, 98 P. at 286).
136. Coleman, 98 P. at 292.
137. Id. at 281.
138. The Coleman court also applied the reasoning of two nineteenth century British cases.
The first, The King v. J. Wright, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1396 (K.B.) 1398; 8 T.R. 293, 296, was an
early case regarding the policy behind the “fair report” privilege in the reporting of judicial
proceedings. The fair report privilege grants the right to report defamatory statements made in
official or public proceedings without liability, provided the report is fair and accurate. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977).
In Wright, the court held that defamatory statements made in a judicial proceeding could be
published because
[t]hough the publication of such proceedings may be to the disadvantage of the particu-
lar individual concerned, yet it is of vast importance to the public that the proceedings
of Courts of Justice should be universally known. The general advantage to the country
in having these proceedings made public, more than counterbalances the inconve-
niences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings.
101 Eng. Rep. at 1399; 8 T.R. at 298.  The court thus found that the societal interest in subjecting
official actions and statements to public scrutiny outweighs the defamatory harm that would
otherwise be actionable. Id.
The Coleman court also considered the public policy supporting publication as articulated in
Davison v. Duncan. Coleman, 98 P. at 286 (citing Davison v. Duncan (1857) 119 Eng. Rep. 1233
(Q.B.) 1233; 7 E1. & B1.229, 231). Davison is one of the earlier cases to consider malice as a
component of conditional privilege.  119 Eng. Rep. at 1233 7 El. & Bl. at 231.  In Davison,
commissioners discussed the town cemetery and the cemetery chaplain at a town meeting. Id.
The cemetery chaplain had obtained his cemetery license from the bishop, and the commission-
ers mentioned that the plaintiff, the bishop’s secretary, helped the chaplain get the license by
making misrepresentations to the bishop. Id.  The defendant, an editor of a newspaper, pub-
lished a report of the meeting, including the commentary about the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
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was based on Kansas case law139 and opinions from other American
jurisdictions analyzing conditional privilege and the applicable malice
standard.140
American courts continued to grapple with these issues.141  In the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts usually restricted the
use of the actual malice test to defamation cases involving candidates
for political office or public officials.  Courts stressed the idea that an
individual running for public office “throws out a challenge to the en-
tire body of voters . . . to canvass his qualifications and fitness for the
position.”142  Emphasizing public policy concerns, courts reasoned
that newspapers “are supported by, and are published with a view to
the dissemination of useful knowledge among, the people.”143  Thus,
the fitness and qualifications of a candidate for an elected office may
be scrutinized by interested newspapers, and much latitude must be
sued for libel. Id.  The court, writing in seriatim, found for the plaintiff, holding that “[t]he
publication of matter defamatory of an individual is not privileged because the libel is contained
in a fair report in a newspaper of what happened at a public meeting.” Id.  However, in the
opinion, the judges began to refine the contours of conditional privilege and malice, considering
whether the statement was true; whether the general public had an interest in what happened at
the meeting; whether the privilege attached to testimony in court extends to all public meetings,
or just to judicial proceedings; and whether the newspaper editor acted with malice, and whether
that mattered. Id. at 1233–34; 7 E1. & B1. at 229–32.
These British cases were cited by several other American courts in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries as they defined the contours of actual malice in the context of condi-
tional privilege. See, e.g., Star Publ’g Co. v. Donahoe, 58 A. 513, 521 (Del. 1904) (citing Davison,
119 Eng. Rep. at 1233; 7 El. & Bl. at 231); Jones, Varnum & Co. v. Townsend’s Adm’x, 21 Fla.
431, 450 (1885) (same); Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 183 (1878) (same); Todd v. Every
Evening Printing Co., 62 A. 1089, 1090 (Del. 1906) (citing Wright, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1399; 8 T.R.
at 298); Barber v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 3 Mo. App. 377, 383 (1877) (same); Paducah Newspa-
pers v. Bratcher, 118 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Ky. 1937) (same); Johns v. Press Publ’g Co., 19 N.Y.S. 3, 4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892) (same); Isley v. Sentinel Co., 113 N.W. 425, 426 (Wis. 1907) (same); Scripps
v. Reilly, 38 Mich. 10, 11 (1878) (same).
139. See, e.g., Redgate v. Roush, 59 P. 1050, 1050 (Kan. 1900) (holding that when the plaintiff
public officer sought damages for defamation, it was his burden to establish actual malice, which
could include “vilification, extravagant language, or evidence of a wrong motive”); Kirkpatrick
v. Eagle Lodge No. 32, 26 Kan. 384, 391 (1881) (holding that a person acts with actual malice
when, “well knowing [a publication’s] falsity, [she] maliciously publishe[s] it for the purpose of
bringing the plaintiff into public scandal, infamy[,] and disgrace”).
140. Jerome Lawrence Merin, The Supreme Court and Libel, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371,
392 (1969).
141. See Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875,
891 (1949).
142. Briggs v. Garrett, 2 A. 513, 518 (Pa. 1886) (extending privilege to published statements
regarding a judge in an election). See, e.g., Crane v. Waters, 10 F. 619, 620 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882)
(extending privilege to publication about candidate for director of the railroad); Carpenter v.
Bailey, 53 N.H. 590, 590 (1874) (same for paymaster of the Navy); Myers v. Longstaff, 84 N.W.
233, 234 (S.D. 1900) (same for candidate for mayor); Express Printing Co. v. Copeland, 64 Tex.
354, 355 (1885) (same).
143. Express Printing, 64 Tex. at 358.
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allowed in publishing charges affecting a candidate’s fitness, so long as
it is done in good faith and in the honest belief that the matter pub-
lished is true.144
Courts have also maintained that actual malice means a statement
“made for the purpose of inflicting an injury,” reasoning that the ac-
tual malice test would ensure that the “public station may ever be
purified, never vilified.”145  Thus, while the Court’s holding in Sullivan
built upon the minority rule for defamation cases involving condi-
tional privilege, the Court’s actual malice standard still marked a sig-
nificant departure from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
minority rule.146
Before Sullivan, the majority of courts followed the defamation rule
announced by the Sixth Circuit in Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam.147
In that case, the Sixth Circuit held that to escape liability for libel, a
critic of official conduct had the burden of proving the truth of the
facts he published because “[t]he question in the case was not what
the plaintiff intended to charge in the article, but what in fact he did
charge, and what the public who were to read the article might reason-
ably suppose he intended to charge.”148  The reasoning of the Post
Publishing court directly contradicted the Coleman court’s logic:
[A] person who enters upon a public office, or becomes a candidate
for one, no more surrenders to the public his private character than
he does his private property. Remedy, by due course of law, for
injury to each, is secured by the same constitutional guaranty, and
the one is no less inviolable than the other. To hold otherwise
would, in our judgment, drive reputable men from public positions,
and fill their places with others having no regard for their reputa-
tion, and thus defeat the purpose of the rule contended for, and
overturn the reason upon which it is sought to sustain it.149
The policy consideration in Coleman ultimately triumphed when the
Sullivan court adopted it as a guidepost.
144. Myers, 84 N.W. at 237; see also Mott v. Dawson, 46 Iowa 533, 537 (1877) (applying the
privilege when the defendant spoke “with the honest purpose of protecting the public from [the]
plaintiff’s supposed dishonesty”).
145. Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 499, 519 (1879).
146. See McLean, supra note 129, at 750–51.  See generally W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MAL-
ICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER Times v. Sullivan 47–74 (1989).
147. 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893).
148. Id. at 539.
149. Id. at 542 (quoting Post Publ’g Co. v. Moloney, 33 N.E. 921, 926 (Ohio 1893)).
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B. Pre-Sullivan Actual Malice Was Common Law Malice
Despite Coleman’s foundational role in Sullivan, “Coleman does
not align well with the actual malice rule described in Sullivan.”150
The Coleman actual malice standard required proof of “evil minded-
ness.”151  “Evil mindedness,” or ill will, is the hallmark of common law
actual malice.152  Pre-Sullivan, the definition of malice was not fixed,
but most definitions “were directly related to the motivation behind
the publication of defamatory material—improper motive, hostility in
publishing, lack of good faith, and the like.”153  Thus, while there was
no firm definition of actual malice, there was a generic common law
concept of actual malice.
The “actual” in common law actual malice stemmed from the evolu-
tion of the common law of defamation:
Before 1825[,] proof of “malice,” in the sense of spite or ill will, was
an essential element of the plaintiff’s case. The pleading of malice
tended, however, to become a formality. In Bromage v. Prosser, the
court held that malice would be implied as a matter of law from the
speaking or writing of the defamatory words unless the reason for
the speaking or writing was prima facie excusable.154
After Bromage, “implied malice” referred to the element of a defama-
tion cause of action “provided by law to the plaintiff for establishing
his prima facie case.”155 Actual malice, on the other hand, was “the
state of mind which the plaintiff might prove to overcome a condi-
tional privilege (or establish his entitlement to punitive damages).”156
And, “[i]n the dictionary of the common law ‘actual malice’ meant
spite or ill will.”157  Thus, the primary difference between the generic
common law concept of actual malice and Sullivan actual malice is ill
will: common law actual malice necessarily involves some element of
ill will, whereas Sullivan actual malice requires no ill will at all.158
Common law actual malice had “a lower threshold” than Sullivan ac-
150. Len Niehoff, Three Puzzling Things About New York Times v. Sullivan: Beginning the
Anniversary Conversation, A.B.A COMM. LAW., June 2013, at 10, 13.
151. Coleman v. MacLennon, 98 P. 281, 281–82 (Kan. 1908).
152. WAT HOPKINS, supra note 146, at 68.
153. Id. at 75.
154. Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 n.15 (1975) (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 1370.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. WAT HOPKINS, supra note 146, at 68.
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tual malice, since “[t]he burden of proving common law actual malice
could be met by showing ill will or hatred.”159
In addition to this “lower threshold,” common law actual malice
and Sullivan actual malice can be distinguished based on the attitude
of the publisher toward the subject of publication.  At common law,
[t]he existence or absence of malice turn[ed] on whether the pub-
lisher had ill feelings toward the subject, or whether he had a desire
to do harm to the subject. That desire to do harm could be an obtru-
sive desire, or it could be implied, based upon the bad faith of or
abuse by the publisher. [Sullivan] Actual Malice is also related to
bad faith or abuse of privilege.  It is not directly related to the atti-
tude of the publisher toward the subject of the publication.  [Sulli-
van] Actual Malice is determined based on the attitude of the
publisher to the material he has published—whether he has gath-
ered and published the material in good faith.160
While the Supreme Court in Sullivan did not create the concept of
actual malice, it refined it by giving it a set formula, something that
the common law concept was missing. After Sullivan, the Court clari-
fied that statutes and cases like Coleman, which applied the generic
common law concept of actual malice, “incorporate constitutionally
invalid standards in the context of criticism of the official conduct of
public officials.”161
V. THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD: ITS
SUPPORTERS AND CRITICS
A number of universities and law reviews have marked Sullivan’s
fiftieth anniversary with symposia focusing on the decision.162  News-
papers and magazine editorials also noted the occasion, and it is not
surprising that many of them took the occasion to praise Justice Bren-
nan’s opinion and the adoption of the actual malice standard.163  How-
159. Id. The author notes, however, that “some methods of demonstrating ill will were similar
to those used in demonstrating Times Rule Actual Malice, the burden for the latter was much
greater.” Id.
160. Id.
161. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1964); see also Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356,
357 (1965) (per curiam); LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 3, at 45–46.
162. Among the symposia were Symposium, The Press and the Constitution 50 Years After
New York Times v. Sullivan, 48 GA. L. REV. 691 (2014); Breaux Symposium: 50 Years After
Times v. Sullivan, GALLEYWEST ALUMNI NEWS, (La. State Univ., Reilly Center for Media &
Public Affairs), Spring, 2014; Univ. of Carolina School of Law, New York Times v. Sullivan, 50
Years Later, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.acslaw.org/events/2013-10-12/new-
york-times-v-sullivan-50-years-later; and Natasha Duarte, Symposium Will Contemplate 50 Years
of Press Freedom, U.N.C. CENTER FOR MEDIA L. & PAGES (Oct. 11, 2013), http://media
law.unc.edu/2013/10/symposium-will-comtemplate-50-years-of-press-freedom.
163. See, e.g., Anna Stolley Persky, A Weakened Shield? 50 Years After New York Times v.
Sullivan, Journalists Wonder Whether Courts Still Value Watchdog Role, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2014, at
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ever, that standard has not been without its critics, both academic and
judicial, who have focused on what they perceive to be the decision’s
adverse effect on reputations, defamation litigation, public civility,
and the political process.164
In 1993, Professors Russell Weaver and Geoffrey Bennett asked the
provocative question:  “Is the New York Times ‘actual malice’ stan-
dard really necessary?” and answered in the affirmative after a com-
parative examination of the American and British approaches to
defamation law.165  In their view, the Court adopted the actual malice
standard because it concluded that it was critical for the functioning of
the political process and necessary to provide “breathing space” for
free and robust debate, which inevitably results in erroneous state-
ments.166  At the same time, Weaver and Bennett felt that the stan-
dard “may no longer provide the breathing space that it once did.”167
The authors offered two pieces of evidence supporting that view:  first,
the rise in the number of defamation lawsuits after the decision; and
second, the increase in litigation expenses resulting from plaintiffs
seeking extensive discovery of the editorial decision-making
process.168
57 (calling Sullivan the decision that “altered the nation’s course on many issues, including the
First Amendment”); Editorial, The Uninhibited Press, 50 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2014,
at 10 (stating that Sullivan “represents the clearest and most forceful defense of press freedom in
American history”); Andrew Cohen, Today Is the 50th Anniversary of the (Re-)Birth of the First
Amendment, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2014, 2:18 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2014/03/today-is-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-re-birth-of-the-first-amendment/284311; Richard
Labunski, Opinion, How Fares Free Speech Half A Century Since Landmark Case?, PROVI-
DENCE J. (Mar. 4, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://www.providencejournal.com/opinion/commentary/2014
0304-richard-labunski-how-fares-free-speech-half-a-century-since-landmark-case.ece (calling
Sullivan “a landmark [case] defending our right to vigorously debate public issues without being
dragged into court”).
164. WAT HOPKINS, supra note 146, at 168–97 (detailing four primary criticisms of the actual
malice standard).
165. Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times “Actual Malice” Standard
Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153 (1993).
166. Id. at 1153–54.  For a discussion of the assumptions underlying the Sullivan decision, see
id. at 1157–61.
167. Id. at 1154, 1179–82.
168. Id. at 1154–55.  The litigation statistics, however, have changed in recent years.  The 2014
Media Law Resource Center Report shows a significant drop in media libel defamation cases
from the 1980s through 2013. MEDIA LAW RES. CENTER, 2014 REPORT ON TRIALS AND DAM-
AGES (2014); see also Press Release, Media Law Res. Center, MLRC Study Shows Sharp De-
crease in Number of Media Trials for Libel and Privacy (Jan. 2014), available at http://www.me
dialaw.org/images/stories/MLRC_Bulletin/2014/Bulletin2014Issue1/mlrctrialreportrelease.pdf.
The number of trials decreased from 268 in the 1980s to 137 from 2000 to 2009, a drop of 49%.
MEDIA LAW RES. CENTER, supra, at 34–35. The majority of the trials from 1980 to 2013 involved
newspapers (54.3%), but trials involving newspapers showed the greatest decline of any media
defendant category. Id.  The cases involving newspapers dropped from 164 in the 1980s to 52 in
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In an attempt to understand the potential impact of the absence of
an actual malice standard, Weaver and Bennett examined defamation
law in Great Britain, a country with a free and vigorous press but
without the Sullivan standard.169  They found that the British press
was far more timid and much less robust than the media in the United
States.170  This led them to conclude that, despite its drawbacks, the
Supreme Court was correct in adopting the actual malice standard.171
Weaver and Bennett supported their view with interviews of journal-
ists and editors in the United States,172 from which the authors con-
cluded that the actual malice standard does not impose an undue
burden on the press and that there is no evidence of “a serious chilling
effect” on the media.173
In March 2014, Harvard Law School Professor Cass R. Sunstein, the
former head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and
now a member of the National Security Agency’s surveillance review
board (and thus a “public figure”), wrote an online article about what
he considered to be the “dark side of New York Times v. Sullivan.”174
Sunstein began by calling the decision “the most important free
speech ruling in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court.”175  In his
view, however, while the Court “granted indispensable breathing
space for speakers,” it also created a continuing problem of “public
civility” and “democratic self-government.”176  Sunstein saw “public
civility” endangered by the actual malice standard, which he believes
“sets an exceedingly high bar” for those seeking to recover for the
harm caused by intentionaly and negligently false statements.177
“Those who spread falsehoods often do so unknowingly, and terrible
sloppiness need not count as recklessness.”178  Because of the high
standard for recovery, “[e]ven if you’re negligent—that is, you should
have known what you’re saying was untrue and defamatory—you are
likely to be protected.”179
the first decade of the 2000s, a 68% decrease, which is much greater than the total decline in
trials. Id.
169. Weaver & Bennett, supra note 165, at 1161–79.
170. Id. at 1189.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1182–89.
173. Id. at 1189–90.
174. Cass R. Sunstein, The Dark Side of New York Times v. Sullivan, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Mar.
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Sunstein also argued that the actual malice standard harms “demo-
cratic self-government” by protecting “all sorts of false allegations,”
such as those about “birth certificates, drug abuse, sexual misconduct
or income tax fraud.”  As a result, “those who seek public office put
their reputation at immediate risk.”  In addition, “[t]alk show hosts,
bloggers and users of social media can spread ugly falsehoods in an
instant—exposing citizens to lies that may well cause them to look on
their leaders with unjustified suspicion.”
Although Sunstein was critical of many of the consequences of the
decision and declined to celebrate its anniversary, he concluded that
“nonetheless, the [C]ourt got the balance right in . . . Sullivan” be-
cause “a free society cannot have uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
debate without breathing room for falsehoods.”
The Weaver and Bennett and Sunstein articles are examples of crit-
ics of the actual malice standard who feel that its benefits make it
worth retaining.  However, others have argued for abolishing the stan-
dard, or at least significantly modifying it.  One of the first was Profes-
sor Richard Epstein, who posed the question:  “Was New York Times
v. Sullivan wrong?” in a 1986 article.180  While he has no doubt that
the case was decided correctly on the facts, Epstein feels that “as a
matter of principle the decision is far more dubious.”181  Instead of
clarifying the law of defamation, Sullivan made the area more contro-
versial.  He cited data from the Libel Defense Resource Center indi-
cating that “the onslaught of defamation actions is greater in number
and severity than it was in the ‘bad old days’ of common law libel.”182
For Epstein, one of the reasons for the increase in defamation litiga-
tion was that, while the Sullivan decision was a necessary victory for
the civil rights movement, “the decision has not stood the test of time
well when applied to the more mundane cases of defamation arising
with public figures and officials.”183  His solution to that problem is to
abandon the actual malice standard and to return to the older com-
mon law rules governing defamation.184  He argues that those rules,
“crafted over many centuries,” strike a better balance between claims
of freedom of speech and the protection of individual reputation than
the actual malice standard which replaced them.185  For Epstein, the
180. Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782
(1986).
181. Id. at 817.
182. Id. at 783.  But see MEDIA LAW RES. CENTER, supra note 168, for the recent media
defamation statistics.
183. Epstein, supra note 180, at 787.
184. Id. at 814–17.
185. Id. at 791.
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final judgment of the desirability of the actual malice standard rests on
the social consequences of the test.  Any variation from the common
law rules must take into account liability and damages, litigation costs,
uncertainty, risk aversion, and reputational effects.186  In all of those
areas, he concludes that the balance of free speech and reputational
harm favors the application of the common law rules rather than the
actual malice standard.187
Instead of adopting Epstein’s call to replace the actual malice stan-
dard with the common law principles of defamation, Benjamin Barron
set out “a proposal to rescue New York Times v. Sullivan by promot-
ing a responsible press.”188  In his 2007 article, Barron posited that the
actual malice standard overprotects speech and underprotects reputa-
tion by encouraging irresponsible practices by the media and remov-
ing any incentive for journalists to investigate and report stories
accurately.189  Barron argued that the Supreme Court “must amend
the actual malice standard to require or encourage responsible jour-
nalistic practices.”190  To achieve that goal, he first set forth a proposal
for the creation of a declaratory judgment proceeding in which a court
could find that specified statements were false.  The purpose of such a
proceeding is to rectify a plaintiff’s injured reputation without impos-
ing damages on the media.191  Barron admitted, however, that if there
is no fear of liability in such a proceeding, the media will not have an
incentive to produce factual reports.192  This led him to examine an
“elastic ten-factor balancing test” created by the British House of
Lords in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd.,193 which balances the
public importance of the speech’s subject matter against the reasona-
bleness of the speaker’s conduct.194  While he felt that the Reynolds
test would compel newspapers to follow a minimum standard of re-
sponsible conduct, he saw two problems with it: first, because of the
complexity of the test, it would not reduce litigation costs, which have
186. Id. at 803–13.
187. Id. at 817.
188. Benjamin Barron, A Proposal To Rescue New York Times v. Sullivan by Promoting a
Responsible Press, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 73 (2007).
189. Id. at 84–93.
190. Id. at 104.
191. Id. at 106–07.
192. Id. at 107.
193. [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) 205 (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
194. Barron, supra note 188, at 110–14.  The ten factors are (1) the seriousness of the allega-
tion; (2) the nature of the information and the extent to which the subject matter is of public
concern; (3) the source of the information; (4) steps taken to verify the information; (5) the
status of the information; (6) the urgency of the matter; (7) whether comment was sought from
the plaintiff; (8) whether the article contains the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story; (9) the
tone of the article; and (10) the circumstances of publication. Id. at 110–11.
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a chilling effect on the media; and second, the test is so vague that it
does not permit the media to predict the outcome of defamation
suits.195
These two problems led Barron to make his own proposal:  a blend
of the declaratory judgment proceeding and the Reynolds multifactor
test.  Under his approach, a court in a declaratory judgment proceed-
ing would consider seven factors:  (1) the amount of investigation
weighed against the public importance of the statement and the mag-
nitude of foreseeable harm to reputation; (2) the degree to which the
allegedly defamatory statements were fact-checked, weighed against
the reliability of the information’s sources; (3) the number of editors
involved with the story and the amount of time they spent reviewing
it; (4) the time sensitivity of the story relative to its public importance;
(5) whether comment was requested from the plaintiff in a timely
fashion; (6) whether the newspaper retracted the story and whether
the retraction was relative to the prominence of the story’s original
publication; and (7) whether the evidence suggests that the newspaper
was aware of the falsity of the story before publishing it.196  Barron
believes his proposal would give a media defendant the option of ob-
taining a pretrial determination that it followed responsible journalis-
tic procedures.197  If successful, the lawsuit would be terminated and
the media would avoid liability.  But, if the media was unsuccessful,
the litigation would proceed under the Sullivan actual malice
standard.198
Barron is not alone in scrutinizing Sullivan’s effect on journalism.
In 1993, then-law professor Elena Kagan wrote a review of Anthony
Lewis’s book on New York Times v. Sullivan, which she entitled “A
Libel Story: Sullivan Then and Now.”199  Kagan (whose appointment
to the Supreme Court was confirmed in 2010) praised Sullivan as “the
Court’s strongest statement . . . of core First Amendment values”;200
however, she also focused on the problems produced by the actual
malice standard.  Unlike other authors, questions about the conse-
quences of that standard did not lead Kagan to conclude that Sullivan
was wrong or to urge that it should be reconsidered.  Instead, they
caused her to focus on what she called the “questionable extensions”
195. Id. at 113.
196. Id. at 114–16.
197. Id. at 118–19.
198. Id. at 114.
199. Elena Kagan, A Libel Story: Sullivan Then and Now, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 197 (1993)
(reviewing ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW:  THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1991)).
200. Id. at 216.
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of the decision to public figures and to cases which had little connec-
tion with the factual situation in Sullivan.201  She suggested focusing
on the underpinning of the decision, limiting the actual malice stan-
dard to speech on matters of public importance or cases involving
powerful individuals.202
Kagan was troubled by what she called “the arresting quiet at the
center” of Sullivan:  the failure of the Justices to criticize, debate, or
question the actual malice standard during deliberations or in the
opinion itself.203  Like Richard Epstein, Kagan questioned why the
Court adopted the actual malice standard rather than constitutionaliz-
ing the common law rules of defamation, which she thought would
have been sufficient to reverse the decision of the Alabama Supreme
Court.204  Although she felt that the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
actual malice standard was justified as a response to the attempt by
Alabama officials and courts to use defamation law to stifle criticism
of public officials, Kagan viewed using that standard in other cases as
imposing serious costs to reputation and to the nature and quality of
public discourse.205  These consequences raised the question of
whether the Court had expanded the decision too far.206
For Kagan, “[t]he obvious dark side of the Sullivan standard is that
it allows grievous reputational damage to occur without monetary
compensation or any other effective remedy.”207  While Anthony
Lewis viewed such harm as an unfortunate but necessary consequence
of uninhibited comment concerning public officials, Kagan asked: “Is
uninhibited defamatory comment an unambiguous social good?  That
is, does it truly enhance public discourse?”208  She drew attention to
the fact that the Sullivan decision promotes false statements of fact,
which can distort public debate.209   She added that the problem “may
go even deeper:  it may involve not merely the promotion of false
statements but also a more general tendency to sensationalize political
discourse.”210  That led her to ask, but not answer, whether Sullivan
bears some responsibility for “increased press arrogance.”211
201. Id. at 208–11.
202. Id. at 212–15.
203. Id. at 201–02.
204. Id. at 202–03.
205. Kagan, supra note 199, at 203–05.
206. Id. at 204–05.
207. Id. at 205.
208. Id. at 206.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 207.
211. Kagan, supra note 199, at 208.
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Judicial calls for the reexamination of the actual malice standard
began in 1985 in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.212
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren Burger agreed with the
plurality that the actual malice standard did not apply to a private
company when the challenged expression was unrelated to a matter of
public concern.213  In his view, the Sullivan decision equated “reckless
disregard of the truth” with malice.  “[T]his should permit a jury in-
struction that malice may be found if the defendant is shown to have
published defamatory material which, in the exercise of reasonable
care, would have been revealed as untrue.”214  However, because the
Court did not adopt that language in Sullivan, Chief Justice Burger
felt that the decision should be reexamined.215
Although Justice Byron White joined in the Sullivan opinion, he
soon came to have doubts about the soundness of the Court’s assump-
tions underlying the actual malice standard.  In the 1974 case Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,216 Justice White dissented on the ground that the
common law remedies for defamation should be retained for private
plaintiffs.  By the time of his concurring opinion in Dun & Bradstreet
in 1984, Justice White had become convinced that the Sullivan Court
struck an unwise balance between the public’s interest in being fully
informed about public officials and affairs, and the competing interest
of those who have been defamed in vindicating their reputation.217  As
a result of the actual malice standard, if a person sues, he frequently
loses on summary judgment or never gets to the jury because of insuf-
ficient proof.  Justice White disagreed with that outcome because if
the plaintiff loses before trial, the public is left to conclude that the
challenged statement was true.218  The public’s only chance of being
accurately informed of the truth or falsity of the statement is the pub-
lic official’s own ability to counter the lie, unaided by courts.  Thus, for
Justice White, the actual malice standard has two evils:  first, the
stream of information about public officials and public affairs is pol-
luted, and often remains polluted, by false information; and second,
the reputation and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be
destroyed by falsehoods that might have been avoided with a reasona-
ble effort to investigate the facts.219  In terms of the First Amendment
212. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
213. Id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
217. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 767 (White, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 768.
219. Id. at 769.
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and reputational interest at stake, Justice White felt those evils were
“grossly perverse results.”220
Instead of adopting the actual malice standard, Justice White ar-
gued that the Sullivan Court could have achieved its goals of provid-
ing “breathing room for speakers” and protecting the media from “the
chilling danger of numerous large damages awards” by retaining the
common law rules of defamation but limiting the amount of damages
that a public figure could recover, or by prohibiting damages en-
tirely.221  Had the Court done so, a public official could prove falsity
and attain a judgment to that effect.222  His reputation would be vindi-
cated, the misinformation would be countered, and the press would
not be unduly threatened with damages.223
Although Justices Warren E. Burger and Byron R. White called for
reconsideration or replacement of the actual malice standard in their
concurring opinions in Dun & Bradstreet, Justice Antonin Scalia is the
only Justice currently on the Court to express support for reversing
Sullivan.  However, he has not done so in the context of a judicial
opinion, nor has he indicated whether he favors returning to the com-
mon law rules, as does Epstein, or some modified version of them, as
proposed by Justice White.  In 2007, in a comment published in Nor-
man Pearlstein’s book Off the Record,224 Justice Scalia stated, without
elaboration, that he probably would vote to reverse New York Times
v. Sullivan.225  Four years later, at the Aspen Institute 2011 Washing-
ton Ideas Forum, Justice Scalia interpreted Sullivan to mean that
you can libel public figures without liability so long as you are rely-
ing on some statement from a reliable source, whether it’s true or
not.
Now the old libel law used to be (that) you’re responsible, you
say something false that harms somebody’s reputation, we don’t
care if it was told to you by nine bishops, you are liable. . . . New
York Times v. Sullivan just cast that aside because the Court
thought in modern society, it’d be a good idea if the press could say
a lot of stuff about public figures without having to worry. And that
may be correct, that may be right, but if it was right it should have
been adopted by the people.  It should have been debated in the
New York Legislature and the New York Legislature could have
220. Id.
221. Id. at 772.
222. Justice White also believed that the common law rules should be preserved when the
plaintiff is not a public official or public figure. Id. at 772.
223. Dunn & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 771–72.
224. NORMAN PEARLSTEIN, OFF THE RECORD: THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR
OVER ANONYMOUS SOURCES 77 (2007).
225. Id. (“In an interview, Justice Antonin Scalia told me that given the chance, he would
probably vote to reverse New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.”).
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said, “Yes, we’re going to change our libel law.”  But the living con-
stitutionalists on the Supreme Court, the Warren Court, simply de-
cided, “Yes, it used to be that . . . George Washington could sue
somebody that libeled him, but we don’t think that’s a good idea
any more.”226
In April 2014, Justices Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg were inter-
viewed jointly at the National Press Club on The Kalb Report.227  Dur-
ing the interview, Justice Scalia disagreed with the decision:  “It was
wrong. . . .  [Y]ou cannot sue somebody for libel unless you can prove
. . . the person knew it was a lie.”  In his view, the framers of the
Constitution “would have been appalled” by the decision and the
adoption of the actual malice standard for public officials.  According
to Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court “was revising the Constitution”
with its opinion, not interpreting it.228  Justice Ginsburg disagreed.
She felt that if the founding fathers had been around in the 1960s, they
would have approved of the decision.229  Today, she said, the ruling is
“well accepted.”230
VI. THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD:  ITS APPLICATION
A. Expanding the Actual Malice Standard
The criticism directed at Sullivan has done little to impede its doc-
trinal march forward.  Over the past fifty years, courts have expanded
the scope of the actual malice standard beyond suits for defamation
brought by public officials against the media.  The Supreme Court has
applied the actual malice standard in tort cases based on false light
invasion of privacy,231 intentional infliction of emotional distress,232
and product disparagement.233  It has expanded the standard to apply
not only to public officials, but also to statements about public
figures.234  Federal appellate courts have applied the actual malice
226. Ken Paulson, Justice Scalia: Reflections on New York Times v. Sullivan, FIRST AMEND-
MENT CENTER (Oct. 11, 2011, 10:37 AM), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/justice-scalia-re
flections-on-new-york-times-v-sullivan.
227. The Kalb Report: Justices Scalia and Ginsberg on the First Amendment (C-SPAN televi-
sion broadcast Apr. 17, 2014), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?318884-1/conversation-




231. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
232. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). See generally Boyd C. Farnam,
Note, Free Speech and Freedom from Speech: Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the New York Times
Actual Malice Standard and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 63 IND. L.J. 877 (1988).
233. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
234. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967).  In Gertz, the Court held that private individuals can no longer recover in defa-
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standard to cases involving the right of publicity235 and tortious inter-
ference with contract,236 and to private individuals speaking on mat-
ters of public concern.237  State courts have also adopted the standard
in cases involving campaign regulations.238
With advances in technology, the actual malice standard has been
applied in areas never contemplated by Justice Brennan when he
wrote the Sullivan opinion.  In January 2014, the Ninth Circuit applied
the standard to a defamation action stemming from a blog post that
was critical of a bankruptcy trustee, holding that a blogger was a
“journalist” and entitled to First Amendment protection.239  The opin-
ion demonstrates both the resilience of the Sullivan framework and its
expanding application to new media.240
In Obsidian Financial Group, LLC v. Cox,241 the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered whether bloggers are entitled to First Amendment protections
previously provided to institutional media defendants.  The Cox case
involved Kevin Padrick, a principal of Obsidian Financial Group,
mation by proving a false statement, no matter how damaging it might be to reputation.  They
must, in addition, prove some “fault,” i.e., at least negligence.  418 U.S. at 347, 350.  Even with
proof of negligence, damages are not presumed; they have to be proved. Id. at 349.  In addition,
punitive damages are not available without proof of Sullivan actual malice. Id.
235. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
236. See, e.g., Med. Lab Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002); Jeffer-
son Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
237. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009); Flamm v. Am. Ass’n of Univ.
Women, 201 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000); In re IBP Confidential Bus. Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632
(8th Cir. 1986); Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1985); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d
637 (3d Cir. 1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
238. See, e.g., Sharkey v. Fla. Elections Comm’n., 90 So. 3d 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012);
McKimm v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 729 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio 2000).
239. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2680 (2014). See generally David L. Hudson Jr., Blogger Gets Press Pass, A.B.A. J., July 2014, at
15.
240. Broad application of the actual malice standard, including to blog articles and other new
media, will ensure its continued vitality.  Unfortunately, the print media directly involved in
Sullivan has been subject to a continuing decline in members. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., STATE
OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2014: OVERVIEW 2–3 (2014) (“[T]otal newspaper advertising revenue in
2012 . . . was down 52% from 2003.”); see also David Carr, Papers Are Down, and Now Out,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2014, at B1 (“The persistent financial demands of Wall Street have
trumped the informational needs of Main Street.”); Christine Haughney, A News Giant Going It
Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2014, at B1 (“The Tribune Company’s publishing unit, including eight
newspapers, is being spun off this week, as the future of print remains unclear.”);  Christine
Haughney & Michael J. de la Merced, Gannett Plans To Split Up Its Print and Broadcast Busi-
nesses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2014, at B3 (“The splintering of print and television companies in the
media industry continued unabated . . . .”); Ravi Somaiya, New York Times Co. Gains Circula-
tion, but Profit Falls 21%, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014, at B2 (“Increased investments in digital
products and a decline in print advertising weighed on the New York Times Company’s second
quarter earnings . . . .”).
241. 740 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2014).
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LLC, a firm that gives advice to businesses in financial distress.  When
an Obsidian client, Summit Accommodators, Inc., filed for reorgani-
zation, the bankruptcy court appointed Padrick as the Chapter 11
trustee.  His main task was to gather assets for the firm’s clients,
whose funds had been misappropriated.
Once Padrick became the trustee, blog publisher Crystal Cox
posted on websites she had created “accusing Padrick and Obsidian of
fraud, corruption, money laundering, and other illegal activities in
connection with the Summit bankruptcy.”242  Cox reportedly had
made similar allegations in the past, and had sought payments in ex-
change for retractions.243  When a cease-and-desist letter from Padrick
and Obsidian failed to stop the posts, they sued for defamation.  A
jury trial involving one blog post resulted in a verdict of $1.5 million
for Padrick and $1 million for Obsidian in compensatory damages.
Judge Andrew Hurwitz, writing for a unanimous Ninth Circuit
panel, considered the level of fault required to establish defamation
liability in the case.  Much of the analysis centered around Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,244 rendered ten years after Sullivan.  The lawsuit
in Gertz was brought by a Chicago attorney accused by a John Birch
Society magazine of being part of a Communist plot to discredit local
law enforcement officials.  In Gertz, the Supreme Court held that in
cases involving a private individual, the First Amendment requires
only proof that the publication was false and that there was “fault” on
the part of the publisher—at least negligence.245  The Ninth Circuit
panel characterized the Cox case as involving “the intersection be-
tween Sullivan and Gertz, an area not yet fully explored by this Cir-
cuit, in the context of a medium of publication—the Internet—
entirely unknown at the time of those decisions.”246
While Padrick and Obsidian argued that the Gertz negligence re-
quirement applies only to suits against the institutional press, the ap-
pellate court found otherwise.  It agreed with its sister circuits that the
“rules in Sullivan and its progeny apply equally to the institutional
press and individual speakers.”247  But, this did not end the inquiry.
242. Id. at 1287.
243. Id. (citing David Carr, When Truth Survives Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2011, at
B1).
244. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
245. Id. at 347–50.
246. Cox, 740 F.3d at 1289–90.
247. Id. at 1291.  Scotusblog.com filed an amicus brief in Cox asserting that “non-traditional
news sources, such as blogs, that provide a useful public service by gathering, analyzing, and
disseminating information are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as traditional
news media even if they cannot make most of the showings outlined by the district court in this
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Padrick and Obsidian asserted that they were not required to establish
Cox’s negligence because Gertz involved a matter of public concern
and the Cox case did not.  However, the panel found that even if the
holding in Gertz is restricted to statements involving matters of public
concern, Cox’s blog post met that standard.  Allegations that an indi-
vidual is involved in crime generally constitute speech regarding a
matter of public concern.248  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that because
Cox’s blog addressed a matter of public concern, the jury could not
find Cox guilty of defamation unless it found she acted at least negli-
gently.249  In addition, the Ninth Circuit held that the lower court
should have instructed the jury that in order to award presumed dam-
ages, it must find that Cox acted with actual malice as articulated in
the Sullivan decision.250
Cox also argued that Padrick and Obsidian were “tantamount to
public officials” because Padrick was a bankruptcy trustee.251  Accord-
ing to Cox, the jury could find her liable for defamation only if she
published the blog with actual malice.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
however, holding that trustees are not public officials by virtue of
their appointments, which do not involve a government position or
government pay.252
B. The Actual Malice Standard and State Courts
A number of states have expanded the actual malice standard to
cover “all defamation cases if the matter published is of public con-
cern, regardless of the status of the plaintiff.”253  Further, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts (Restatement) requires a plaintiff to show
actual malice254 in order to overcome a conditional privilege.255  Con-
sistent with the Restatement, the states have increasingly adopted the
case.”  Amicus Brief of Scotusblog.com in Support of Neither Party at 16, Cox, 740 F.3d 1284
(2014) (No. 3:11-cv-00057-HZ).
248. Cox, 740 F.3d at 1291.
249. Id. at 1292.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1293.
252. Id. at 1293.  Padrick and Obsidian argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in
granting Cox summary judgment on her other blogs. Id.  The Ninth Circuit rejected the cross-
appeal, finding the blogs did not contain assertions of objective facts. Id.
253. William F. Cuozzi & Lee Sporn, Note, Private Lives and Public Concerns: The Decade
Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 51 BROOK. L. REV. 425, 428 n.12, 454–55 (1985) (noting that
various states have adopted the actual malice standard in this context, including Colorado, Indi-
ana, and Michigan).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977) (“[O]ne who upon an occasion giving
rise to a conditional privilege publishes false and defamatory matter concerning another abuses
the privilege if he (a) knows the matter to be false, or (b) acts in reckless disregard as to its truth
or falsity.”).
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actual malice standard to adjudicate the abuse of conditional or quali-
fied privileges over the last twenty-five years.
The expanded application of the actual malice standard is largely a
result of its ability to balance the reputational concerns inherent to
defamation law with the need to protect certain communications that
serve broad societal interests.  Scholars have noted the benefits of the
actual malice standard in the conditional privilege context as opposed
to traditional common law approaches, which require a showing that
the statement was made out of “spite or ill will.”256  The “employer
evaluation” conditional privilege257 illustrates the fundamental attrib-
utes of the actual malice standard that underlie its expanded adoption
among various state courts.258
The emotion that may accompany an employee’s termination ren-
ders the traditional common law approach ineffective in distinguishing
cases when the conditional privilege should apply from those when a
“genuine abuse of the privilege exists.”259  More importantly, the ac-
tual malice standard promotes the dissemination of information be-
tween employers, which allows them to accurately evaluate
prospective employees based on candid discussions of their qualities
and qualifications.  But, the standard also applies with enough bite to
serve “as a legal check against the deliberate or reckless maligning of
an employee.”260  Thus, the actual malice standard is sensitive to the
broad societal need of open communication between employers and
other interested parties in order to stimulate sound business practices
and effective hiring of employees, and concurrently provides employ-
ees with protection from patently unfounded negative assertions
about their abilities and qualifications.  In recognition of these bene-
255. Id.  “A conditional [or qualified] privilege arises to protect a legitimate interest of the
publisher, the recipient, or a third person. . . . The privilege also extends to statements made to
advance a legitimate common interest between the publisher and the recipient of the publica-
tion.”  Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 221 P.3d 205, 214 (Utah 2009) (citation omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); see also 1 SACK, supra note 129, at § 9:3 (4th ed. 2014).
256. 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 15:31 (2d ed. 2013); see also 1 SACK,
supra note 130, § 9:3.1 (“Malice in its common-law sense is spite, ill will, hatred, or the intent to
inflict harm, or a direct intention to injure another . . . it has been said to be the equivalent of
bad faith.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
257. The “employer evaluation” conditional privilege “protects an employer’s communication
to other . . . interested parties concerning the reasons for an employee’s discharge.” Ferguson,
221 P.3d at 214 (quoting Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
258. Parallel state application of the actual malice standard to conditional or qualified privi-
leges provides a level of simplicity to the “complex and chaotic” field of defamation law. See 2
SMOLLA, supra note 256, § 15:31.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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fits, many states have adopted the actual malice standard in other ar-
eas to analyze the abuse of conditional privileges.261
In Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc. the Supreme Court of Utah
applied the actual malice standard to a defamation claim brought by
an attorney against his former partners.262  In 1991, the plaintiff and
his partners formed a law firm,263 where he worked as a trial attorney
for approximately fourteen years.264  In 2005, the plaintiff billed far
more than his typical number of hours, creating suspicion about his
billing practices.265  The defendant partners initiated an investigation
and “came to the inescapable conclusion that [the plaintiff] was
overbilling.”266  Following the investigation, the defendants termi-
nated the plaintiff and also informed one of the plaintiff’s clients that
it could “no longer trust [the plaintiff’s] bills.”267  In response, the
plaintiff brought a defamation suit.
The trial court found that the defendant partners had “a conditional
or qualified privilege in making the defamatory statement to [the cli-
ent]” and granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict.268
The motion was granted on the basis that no evidence had been
presented that the defendants “made the allegedly defamatory state-
ment knowing it was false or that they acted in reckless disregard as to
its falsity.”269 The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, because “in balanc-
ing the justification for the privilege against the individual’s interests
in reputation, the necessity of deeming certain statements privileged
261. See, e.g., DeNardo v. Bax, 147 P.3d 672, 679 (Alaska 2006) (holding that when a condi-
tional privilege exists, a plaintiff must show that “the publisher had knowledge or [acted in]
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the defamatory matter”); Miller v. Servicemaster by Rees,
851 P.2d 143, 146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (“[A] plaintiff must prove the privilege was abused by
proving actual malice or by demonstrating excessive publication. Actual malice is a question of
fact for a jury and it can be demonstrated by proving a defendant made a statement knowing it
was false or with reckless disregard of its truth.” (citations omitted)); McIntryre v. Jones, 194
P.3d 519, 530 (Colo. App. 2008) (stating that when the statement involves a matter of public
concern or pertains to a public official or public figure, “the plaintiff . . . must prove that the
defendant published the statement with actual malice”); Ball v. British Petroleum Oil, 670
N.E.2d 289, 293, 295 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding that a question of fact existed as to whether
the defendant “act[ed] with reckless disregard at to . . . the truth or falsity [of the statements he
made]”); Hagler v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 884 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. 1994) (“Actual malice
is not ill will; it is the making of a statement with knowledge that it is false, or with reckless
disregard of whether it is true.”).
262. Ferguson, 221 P.3d at 212.
263. Id. at 209.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 210.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 211.
268. Ferguson, 221 P.3d at 211.
269. Id.
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requires some room for honest error, but not for known falsity or
recklessness.”270  To achieve this balance, the court adopted the actual
malice standard, holding that “a plaintiff can show abuse of a condi-
tional privilege where the defendant (1) made a defamatory statement
knowing it to be false or (2) acted in reckless disregard as to its fal-
sity.”271  Thus, Ferguson demonstrates the actual malice standard’s
unique suitability to defamation claims in which communications of
broad societal interest are at issue.
Although many states have applied the actual malice standard to
claims of abuse of conditional privileges, several states seemingly con-
fuse (or, perhaps more appropriately, conflate) the actual malice stan-
dard and the common law “ill will” approach.272  One reason for the
confusion is that courts give differing meaning to  “malice” as used in
Sullivan and the “malice” as employed in traditional common law
cases.273  As a result, “courts often fail to make careful distinctions
between the two in deciding whether a defendant has forfeited a com-
mon[ ]law conditional privilege.”274  In turn, some courts have used
the term actual malice when, in reality, they have applied common law
malice.275  For instance, in the Ohio case Hahn v. Kotten, which in-
volved an alleged abuse of conditional privilege, the Ohio Supreme
Court stated, “In the case of a privileged communication, however,
express malice as distinguished from malice in law must be shown;
that is to say, if the occasion be privileged, the plaintiff may not re-
cover . . . unless he goes further and shows that . . . defendant was
moved by actual malice, such as ill will, spite, grudge or some ulterior
motive.”276
Similarly, in Evely v. Carlon Co. the Ohio Supreme Court stated
that
appellant had the burden of showing that appellee acted with actual
malice . . .
270. Id. at 214.
271. Id. at 214–15.
272. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Frank, 573 N.E.2d 609, 613 (Ohio 1991) (“Unfortunately, several cases
appear to confuse the two standards, and transmute ‘actual malice’ as defined in a public defa-
mation action into the common-law standard.”).
273. Indeed, Justice Brennan “came to regret using the term ‘malice’ as too confusing, espe-
cially to juries, who associated the word with the idea of hatred or ill will.  Brennan said later he
wished he had picked another term for the idea of knowing or reckless falsehood.” STERN &
WERMIEL, supra note 112, at 227.
274. 1 SACK, supra note 130, § 9:3.2. An important distinction between the Sullivan actual
malice standard and the traditional common law approach is that the former “focuses on the
defendant’s attitude towards the truth, [while traditional common law standards focus] on his or
her attitude towards the plaintiff.” Id.
275. Id.
276. Hahn v. Kotten, 331 N.E.2d 713, 721 (Ohio 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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. . . appellant had not sustained his burden of proof of malice in
the publication of such alleged actionable defamations.  In such ma-
terial there was no showing of any ill will, spite, or some ulterior
motive on the part of appellee’s officers toward this appellant.277
Thus, while Ferguson illustrates effective state adoption of the actual
malice standard, it appears that some state courts profess to imple-
ment the actual malice standard while actually applying the traditional
common law approach.
In other states, confusion arises because courts employ incompati-
ble (and arguably mutually exclusive) standards for conditional privi-
leges and actual malice. This problem was resolved in the Illinois case
Kuwik v. Starmark, in which the Illinois Supreme Court modified the
requirements of a “conditional privilege” to enhance its compatibility
with the actual malice standard.278
In Kuwik, a physician filed a defamation action against an insurance
company because of letters it sent to the physician’s patient and to the
Illinois Department of Insurance denying payment for the physician’s
services on the ground that they were “outside the scope of the prac-
ticing physician’s license.”279  In affirming the appellate court’s denial
of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the state supreme
court resolved “troubling aspects of the current Illinois test” that re-
sulted in confusion among the state’s courts.280  Under the test used
by the trial court, a defendant was required to show that a statement
was made “in good faith” for a conditional privilege to apply (a deter-
mination made by the trial court), and then a jury would have to find
that the statement was made “in bad faith” to overcome the condi-
tional privilege.281
Referring to this conundrum as an “apparent anomaly,” the Illinois
Supreme Court pointed out that “[t]he two inquiries are too similar to
justify two separate determinations, one by the judge as a question of
law, and one by the jury as a question of fact.  Such a process only
serves to add confusion to an already confusing area of law.”282  The
court adopted the conditional privilege standard espoused by the Re-
statement,283 which eliminates the “bad faith” inquiry, places the en-
tire determination in the hands of the jury, and offers three
unambiguous circumstances which give rise to a conditional privi-
277. Evely v. Carlon Co., 447 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (Ohio 1983).
278. Kuwik v. Starmark Star Mktg. & Admin., Inc., 619 N.E.2d 129 (Ill. 1993).
279. Id. at 130.
280. Id. at 134.
281. Id. at 133–34.
282. Id. at 134.
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 593-99 (1977).
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lege.284  The court then held “that to prove an abuse of the qualified
privilege, the plaintiff must show a direct intention to injure another,
or . . . a reckless disregard of [the defamed party’s] rights.”285  The
court ruled that material facts existed as to whether the defendant
acted “with reckless disregard as to [the] plaintiff’s rights,” and there-
fore affirmed the appellate court’s denial of the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment.286
While Hahn287 and Evely288 demonstrate some of the confusion that
may accompany state courts’ application of the actual malice stan-
dard, Kuwik illustrates the proactive measures that state high courts
can take to resolve this confusion and allow for the proper application
of the actual malice standard.  The fact that more states have adopted
the actual malice standard demonstrates its recognized advantages in
promoting societal interests and the broad utility of its application.
C. The Actual Malice Standard and Labor Disputes
The expansion of the actual malice standard has not been limited to
lower courts.  Shortly after adopting the standard in Sullivan, the
United States Supreme Court applied it to resolve labor disputes.  Al-
though the Court has not applied the test in this context since 1974,
many lower federal and state courts have.  The continued use of the
actual malice standard indicates that the test is workable; it strikes an
appropriate balance between important protections afforded by fed-
eral labor laws and the states’ interests in protecting individuals
against defamatory communications.  The case law also demonstrates
that courts have applied the test to claims in different industries under
284. Kuwik, 619 N.E.2d at 135 (“Under the analysis just adopted, conditionally privileged
occasions have been said to be divided into three classes: (1) situations in which some interest of
the person who publishes the defamatory matter is involved[;] (2) situations in which some inter-
est of the person to whom the matter is published or of some other third person is involved[;
and] (3) situations in which a recognized interest of the public is concerned.”).
285. Id. at 135 (citations omitted) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court further clarified the standard, stating that “an abuse of a qualified privilege may con-
sist of any reckless act which shows a disregard for the defamed party’s rights, including the
failure to properly investigate the truth of the matter, limit the scope of the material, or send the
material to only the proper parties.” Id. at 136.
286. Id.
287. 331 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio 1975).
288. 447 N.E.2d 1290 (Ohio 1983).
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different labor laws289 and have adjusted the standard’s scope as
needed to fit the evolving private sector labor context.290
1. The Adoption of the Actual Malice Standard in Linn and Letter
Carriers
In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114,291
the Supreme Court adopted the Sullivan actual malice standard for
defamation claims arising from “labor disputes.”  Before Linn, courts
had interpreted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to have a
preemptive effect on defamation claims arising out of union organiz-
ing campaigns.  In Linn, the Supreme Court examined the extent to
which potentially defamatory statements made in labor disputes lose
protection under the NLRA so that a complainant may pursue relief
under state defamation laws.292  The Court recognized the importance
of achieving a balance between the strong federal interest in uniform
labor regulation and the deeply rooted state interest in protecting citi-
zens from defamation.293
289. There are two primary labor law statutes that apply in the private sector—the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012), and the Railway Labor Act (RLA),
45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2012).  In Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, the appellate court applied Linn
v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), and Old Dominion Branch No.
496, National Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), to labor strike activity
involving an airline covered by the RLA. 193 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 1999). See also
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 882 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Linn and Letter
Carriers under the RLA); Cain v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., No. 2:04-CV-347, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4373, at *51–52 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 19, 2006) (applying Linn, Letter Carriers, and the actual
malice standard to a defamation claim in the railway context).
290. For a discussion of the application of the actual malice standard to labor disputes, see
generally 1 SACK, supra note 130, § 5:7; and SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, A.B.A., 2 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2496–99 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012).
291. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).  The plaintiff, an assistant manager for a security guard company,
sued the union for defamation under state law. Id. at 55–56.  The plaintiff alleged that during the
union’s organizing campaign, it distributed leaflets to company employees that contained defam-
atory statements about management. Id. at 56.  Upon establishing the actual malice test to gov-
ern defamation claims in the labor dispute context, the Court ultimately granted the plaintiff
leave to amend his complaint pursuant to the actual malice requirements. Id. at 66.
292. Id. at 63–65.
293. Id. at 57–58.  The Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Linn (filed by Solicitor
General Thurgood Marshall and others) addressed these issues.  With regard to the federal inter-
ests, the brief commented:
On this point the [Sullivan] libel case again provides an instructive analogy.  The
Court there made clear . . . that damages could constitutionally be awarded a public
official in a defamation suit against a critic of his official conduct if actual malice was
proved . . . .  If the interest in free and wide-open debate in the political arena thus
stops short of requiring the protection of malicious defamation, it is difficult to justify a
rule of complete preclusion in the labor arena.  There is, to be sure, always the danger
that a particular jury might find actual malice in a case where there was in fact none,
with the result that a participant in a representation or organizing campaign was penal-
46 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1
The Court looked to the NLRA,294 which affords protection to con-
duct during union organizing activities that could be fairly character-
ized as fraught with “bitter and extreme charges, countercharges,
unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal accusations, misrepresen-
tations, and distortions.”295 The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board), the federal agency responsible for interpreting and
enforcing the NLRA, provided great latitude to competing parties in
organizing campaigns, extending Section 7 protections to cover repul-
sive and caustic speech.296 The Court held that while the Board toler-
ated “intemperate, abusive[,] and inaccurate statements” made during
union organizing campaigns, the Board did not interpret the NLRA
“as giving either party license to injure the other intentionally by cir-
culating defamatory or insulting material known to be false.”297 The
Court concluded that this deliberate and egregious defamatory con-
duct lost protection under the NLRA.298
The Court also recognized a compelling state interest in protecting
citizens from defamatory conduct known to be false.  It found that a
state’s concern in compensating a victim and enabling him to vindicate
his reputation is “so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility”
ized for conduct which the [NLRB], had it been the finder of the facts, would have
deemed fair and legitimate, indeed federally protected, campaign tactics.  But we do
not think that this risk is so great as to override the States’ strong interest in providing
redress for such aggravated instances of defamatory conduct . . . .
Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 38–39, Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114,
383 U.S. 53 (1966) (No. 45).
294. Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 158(a)(3) . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
295. Linn, 383 U.S. at 58.
296. Id. at 60–61.  The NLRB concluded that epithets common in the labor dispute context,
including “scab,” “unfair,” and “liar,” were protected under Section 7 despite their defamatory
effect. Id.  Harking back to Sullivan, the Court reasoned that “as we stated in another context,
cases involving speech are to be considered ‘against the background of a profound . . . commit-
ment to the principal that debate . . . should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasant sharp attacks.’” Id. at 62 (quot-
ing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
297. Id. at 61.
298. Id.
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that such a victim should not be barred by the vision of a unitary na-
tional labor policy.299
To properly balance the open discussion envisioned by the NLRA
and a state’s deep interest in protecting its citizens, the Court applied
“by analogy, rather than under constitutional compulsion,” the Sulli-
van actual malice standard.300  The Court held that defamatory state-
ments made in the context of union organizing campaigns are
actionable under state defamation law only if the complainant pleads
and proves that they were made with actual malice and resulted in
injury.301  Actual malice, the Court explained, could be demonstrated
by the Sullivan standard with proof that the defamatory statements
were published with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disre-
gard for the truth.302
Eight years after Linn, the Supreme Court decided Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, National Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, which also
addressed when a state defamation claim can survive federal labor law
preemption in the course of a labor dispute.303 Although Letter Carri-
ers followed the actual malice standard applied in Linn, the decision is
significant in its own right for two reasons:  first, it expanded Linn by
giving broader meaning to the “labor disputes” that are subject to the
actual malice standard; and second, it clarified the actual malice stan-
dard and acknowledged its distinction from common law malice.
The Linn actual malice test was applied to defamation claims raised
in labor disputes. In Letter Carriers, the Court concluded that the ap-
plicability of the actual malice standard extends beyond disputes be-
tween labor and management.304 The dispute in Letter Carriers
involved two nonunion employees alleging defamation against the
299. Id. at 62 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 248 (1959))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
300. Id. at 65.
301. Linn, 383 U.S. at 65.
302. Id.
303. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).  While the Court was dealing with an Executive Order governing
federal employment rather than the NLRA’s protections for private labor disputes, it reasoned
that the same accommodation to competing federal and state interests applied. Id. at 273.  In
Dale v. Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass’n., the Ohio Supreme Court cited Linn and applied
the actual malice standard to a defamation claim arising from a union election involving public
sector employment.  567 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ohio 1991).  The court held that
[a] “labor dispute” is any controversy over the terms and conditions of employment, or
the representation of employees for collective bargaining purposes, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the relation of employer and employee, and . . . of
whether the dispute is subject to the jurisdiction of the [NLRB], the State Employee
Relations Board, or some other administrative agency.
Id. at 253.
304. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 278.
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union for publishing statements in a union newsletter attacking the
plaintiffs for resisting union membership.305 In categorizing this con-
troversy as a labor dispute, the Court reasoned that NLRA protec-
tions are not limited to defamatory statements made during union
election campaigns.  Indeed, the applicability of Linn’s actual malice
standard extends to “any publication made during the course of union
organizing efforts, which is arguably relevant to that organizational
activity.”306  Moreover, the Court held that organizing activities that
lead to union recognition and organizing activities that follow union
recognition are entitled to the same protections.307  Therefore, a
union’s postrecognition attempts to achieve 100% membership or to
preserve its majority status are NLRA-protected organizing efforts
subject to the actual malice standard.
Letter Carriers is also significant because the Court clarified the
meaning of actual malice.  The Court held that the lower courts erred
by defining malice in the common law sense of “hatred, personal spite,
ill will, or desire to injure.”308  Malice in the context of defamatory
statements made during a labor dispute, the Court explained, is
strictly defined as making such statements “with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”309
While reaffirming the definition of actual malice adopted by Linn, the
Court also explained that before applying the standard there must
first be a false statement of fact.310  The Court distinguished opinions
from representations of fact, concluding that the plaintiff in Letter
Carriers failed to demonstrate that the union had made a false state-
ment of fact.  The Court cautioned, however, that there may be situa-
tions “where the use of this writing or other similar rhetoric in a labor
dispute could be actionable, particularly if some of its words were
taken out of context and used in such a way as to convey a false repre-
sentation of fact.”311
While the Supreme Court has not applied the actual malice stan-
dard in the labor context since Linn and Letter Carriers, those two
cases have served as an important foundation for its future use.  In-
deed, the use of the actual malice test has been marked by a general
expansion of what constitutes a labor dispute, a careful distinction be-
305. Id. at 266–67.
306. Id. at 279.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 281.
309. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
310. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 284 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40
(1973)).
311. Id. at 286.
2014] NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN AT 50 49
tween assertion of fact and opinion, and a subjective interpretation of
the type of conduct that demonstrates actual malice.
2. Application of the Actual Malice Standard in Cases After Linn
and Letter Carriers
The Supreme Court’s expansion of the definition of a “labor dis-
pute” was a hallmark of the Letter Carriers decision, extending the
reach of the actual malice standard to postrecognition issues.312  The
definition given to a “dispute” is of great significance because if the
parties are not engaged in a labor dispute, then the court is not subject
to the federally mandated actual malice standard.  A number of deci-
sions have followed Letter Carriers’ expansive interpretation of what
constitutes a labor dispute, thereby broadening the reach of the actual
malice standard.313
In Hughes v. Northern California Carpenters Regional Council,314
however, the California appellate court refused to apply the actual
malice standard after determining that the parties were not engaged in
a labor dispute within the meaning of Letter Carriers.315 In Hughes,
312. The opinion in Letter Carriers reasoned:
[W]hether Linn’s partial pre-emption of state libel remedies is applicable obviously
cannot depend on some abstract notion of what constitutes a “labor dispute”; rather
application of Linn must turn on whether the defamatory publication is made in a con-
text where the policies of the federal labor laws leading to protection for freedom of
speech are significantly implicated.
Id. at 279.  Significantly, the NLRA defines a “labor dispute” as “any controversy concerning
terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.”  29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2012).
313. See, e.g., Seven Bros. Painting v. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council No. 2, No. 09-
12506, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62540, at *9 (E.D. Mich. June 10, 2011) (finding that a non-union
painting company and local union were engaged in a “labor dispute” when the dispute centered
on the union’s claim that the painting company’s unionized sister company was routing work
through the non-union company to avoid wage and benefit requirements under collective bar-
gaining agreement); Point Ruston, LLC v. Pac. Nw. Reg’l Council of the United Bhd. of
Carpenters, No. C09-5232BHS, 2010 LEXIS 95239, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2010) (finding
that a labor dispute existed between a general contractor and the union when the contractor
refused to terminate a contract with the only non-union subcontractor it was using for a project);
Murray v. Tarley, No. C2-01-693, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28154, at *21–22 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20,
2002) (finding that a union secretary-treasurers’ remarks about a coal company owner fit within
the broad definition of labor dispute as they referred to coal owner’s unfair, untruthful, and
discriminatory treatment of employees, which involved the employees’ terms and conditions of
employment as defined by the NLRA).
314. No. A112272, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4003, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2007).
315. Id. at *17.  In another case, the trial court refused to instruct the jury that the plaintiff
construction company owner needed to prove that the union acted with actual malice when it
circulated handbills containing a limerick that indicated the plaintiff made “crappy” homes.  J.
Maki Constr. Co. v. Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 882 N.E.2d 1173, 1177, 1181 (Ill. App. Ct.
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the defendant union and Hughes, the plaintiff drywall company
owner, were initially involved in a labor dispute when the union or-
ganized a picket line and claimed that Hughes paid workers less than
the established area standard.316 Out of feelings of anger and embar-
rassment, and to convey a message of “piss on you” and “kiss my
ass,”317 Hughes allegedly exposed himself to the picketers.318 The
union filed a police report in response to Hughes’ alleged indecent
exposure and later distributed flyers, which included a redacted copy
of the police report and the message:
On the above date and time, suspect (Blanked out) exposed his pe-
nis to victim [union organizer] and made lewd gestures towards him
while in public, [a] violation [of Penal Code section] 314 . . . . Ask
Keith Christopherson (a homebuilder that exclusively subcon-
tracted Hughes) why Christopherson Homes allows Roger Hughes
to work near your children. 707-524-8222.319
Hughes sued the union for defamation, alleging that the distribution
of the flyers caused him significant emotional distress and loss of busi-
ness.320  A jury found in favor of Hughes on his defamation claim,
concluding that the union acted with malice in distributing the fly-
ers.321 The union appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in in-
structing the jury that Hughes only needed to prove that the union
“failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of the
statements [before publishing them].”322  The union contended that
the actual malice standard applied because the parties were engaged
in a labor dispute, requiring Hughes to prove actual malice.323
The appellate court disagreed, citing Letter Carriers to support its
decision.324  While Letter Carriers stated that preemption of state def-
amation claims could not be dependent upon some “abstract notion of
2008).  The trial court defined malice in the common law sense as “ill will” or having “evil inten-
tions” and instructed the jury that malice meant that the defendant union published “defamatory
communication with wanton disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights, with ill will, and with an evil inten-
tion to defame and injure Plaintiff.” Id. at 1181.  On the union’s appeal of the jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, the trial court found no connection between the quality of the homes
attacked by the union in the handbill and the plaintiff’s alleged underpayment of wages and
benefits to its employees. Id. at 1182.  Therefore, the trial court properly determined the hand-
bill was merely the union’s attempt to get the contractor to comply with regional labor standards
and not a labor dispute. Id. at 1186–87.
316. Hughes, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4003, at *4.
317. Id. at *5.
318. Id. at *5–6.
319. Id. at *7.
320. Id. at *9.
321. Id. at *1.
322. Hughes, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4003, at *9.
323. Id. at *10.
324. Id. at *4.
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what constitutes a labor dispute,” it limited labor disputes to union
organizing activities.325  In Hughes, the union was not trying to organ-
ize Hughes’ employees and did not distribute the flyers in connection
with any organizing activity.326
Acknowledging that some courts have extended the scope of Linn
and Letter Carriers to conduct outside union organizing activity,327 the
appellate court maintained that the union’s distribution of the flyers
was not part of a labor dispute.328  The dispute between Hughes and
the union centered on the union’s contention that Hughes failed to
pay his workers the “area standard” rate of pay.329  The flyers did not
mention the area standards or serve any other job-related purpose.330
The union testified that the purpose of the flyers was to inform the
general public about Hughes’ offensive behavior.331  As such, the
court found that the flyers were not relevant to any labor dispute that
existed between Hughes and the union, or any issue “conceivably sub-
ject to the protections of [Section] 7 or the prohibitions of [Section] 8
of the [NLRA].”332 Accordingly, Hughes was not required to satisfy
the heightened actual malice standard to succeed in his defamation
claim against the union.333
325. Id. at *12–13.
326. Id. at *13.
327. Id. at *13–14.
328. Hughes, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4003, at *13–14.
329. Id. at *14–15.
330. Id. The court noted that although the flyer mentioned the picketing and “ongoing dis-
pute,” it did not bring the flyer within the protections and prohibitions of the NLRA. Id. at *14
n.6.
331. Id. at *14–15.
332. Id. at *16 (third alteration in original) (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l
Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 279) (internal quotation marks omitted).  What
constitutes a “labor dispute” should generally be based on an examination of the underlying
facts of the controversy as well as the scope of the labor statute involved. Compare Oetzman v.
Ahrens, 427 N.W.2d 421 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that letters written by a union staff repre-
sentative about a personnel manager alleging sexual harassment of a union member did not
constitute a labor dispute because the conduct had nothing to do with an election, strike, or an
issue between labor and management), with Wallulis v. Dymowski, 895 P.2d 315 (Or. App. Ct.
1995) (finding that complaints about working conditions occurred during a labor dispute under a
broad statutory definition).
333. Courts have spent a great deal of time scrutinizing the distinction that Letter Carriers
drew between actionable assertions of fact and nonactionable opinions or rhetorical hyperbole.
In Letter Carriers, the Court explained that before determining whether a defamatory statement
was made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, there must first be a false
statement of fact.  418 U.S. at 284 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40
(1974)).  The Court concluded that the use of “loose language” like “traitor,” “unfair,” or “fas-
cist,” reflects an opinion and does not constitute a fact. Id.  “Expression of such an opinion,
even in the most pejorative terms, is protected under federal labor law.” Id. The Court cau-
tioned, however, that there may be situations “where the use of this writing or other similar
rhetoric in a labor dispute could be actionable, particularly if some of its words were taken out of
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Some courts have struggled with constructing a uniform approach
for determining whether actual malice is present. Linn established
that a plaintiff’s defamation claim is subject to preemption under fed-
eral labor laws unless the plaintiff pleads and proves actual malice—
that the defamatory statements were made with knowledge of their
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.334  Yet, some recent
case law acknowledges this standard but applies it improperly.335
Creating a uniform approach to determining whether a plaintiff has
established actual malice can be difficult because the standard is sub-
jective and requires the court to get inside the defendant’s head.  In
Chicago District Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Reinke Insula-
tion Co.,336 the court attempted to do just that and teased out the
requirements of proving actual malice.  The defendant union sus-
pected that Reinke, the plaintiff contractor, was delinquent in making
pension and welfare benefit payments to the union, violating their col-
lective bargaining agreement.337  Based on the results of a preliminary
report supporting the union’s suspicion of Reinke’s delinquency, the
context and used in such a way as to convey a false representation of fact.” Id. at 286.  For
further discussion of opinion and rhetorical hyperbole in defamation actions, see John Bruce
Lewis & Gregory V. Mersol, Opinion and Rhetorical Hyperbole in Workplace Defamation Ac-
tions: The Continuing Quest for Meaningful Standards, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 19 (2002); and 1
SMOLLA, supra note 256, §§ 4.7–4.11.
334. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966).
335. In Magic Laundry Servs. v. Workers United SEIU, the court cited Letter Carriers and set
forth the actual malice standard.  No. CV-12-9654-MWF (AJWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43296,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2013). The court recognized that a number of the defendant’s statements
were false assertions of fact. Id. at *14.  But when the court analyzed the question of actual
malice, it offered only a few conclusory sentences finding that the plaintiff failed to meet this
heightened burden. Id. at *14–15. Similarly, in Duane Reade Inc. v. Local 338 Retail, Wholesale,
Department Store Union, the court cited the standards set forth in Linn and Letter Carriers only
to reach a conclusion on actual malice in one sentence, stating that “[b]ased on the facts alleged,
Duane Reade cannot demonstrate that the allegedly defamatory statements are maliciously
false.”  791 N.Y.S.2d 288, 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).  In Shepard v. Courtoise, the court denied the
defendant union’s motion for summary judgment as to statements alleging that the plaintiff su-
pervisor “abused” employees.  115 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1148 (E.D. Mo. 2000).  After concluding
that the parties were engaged in a labor dispute and that the statements regarding “abuse” could
be construed as false statements of fact, the court considered whether the plaintiff proved actual
malice.  Id. at 1147.  To support his claim, the plaintiff provided testimony from two subordinate
employees and a colleague, asserting that the plaintiff never abused any employees. Id. at
1147–48.  Based on this testimony, the court concluded that the plaintiff had “presented clear
and convincing evidence to support a finding of actual malice.” Id. at 1148.  Similar to the cases
discussed above, the court offered this conclusion without truly analyzing the defendant’s subjec-
tive state of mind or relevant knowledge.  The court failed to explain how the employees’ testi-
mony, which affirmed that the plaintiff never abused his employees, demonstrated that the
defendant made the statements with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for their
truth.
336. 464 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2006).
337. Id. at 653.
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union picketed Reinke’s job sites.338  Reinke attempted to stop the
picketing by presenting the results of its own auditor’s report, which
concluded that Reinke was not delinquent.339 The union refused to
consider this report.340  Reinke also offered to pay the alleged delin-
quent amount in exchange for the picketing to cease.341 The union
also refused this offer.342  Although the picketing eventually ceased,
the union later circulated handbills which read, “The HARD working
employees of Reinke have been cheated on their MEDICAL and
RETIREMENT contributions!”343  Reinke sued for defamation,
maintaining that the union’s assertion that Reinke cheated its employ-
ees out of benefits was made with reckless disregard for the truth.
To determine whether the union acted with reckless disregard for
the truth by circulating the flyers, the court explained that the ques-
tion was not whether a reasonable person would have accused Reinke
of cheating its employees.  Instead, the issue was “whether there [was]
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the [Union] in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [its] publication,”344 or
“whether there is sufficient evidence to show that the Union had a
high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity.”345
The court held that a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s
state of mind with circumstantial evidence, but cautioned that “courts
must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors.”346
The court ultimately concluded that Reinke failed to establish actual
malice. While the union’s delinquency report was preliminary, nothing
suggested it was inaccurate, and the union’s reliance on this report did
not demonstrate reckless disregard for the truth.347 Similarly, the
union’s refusal to accept Reinke’s internal audit was not evidence of
“purposeful avoidance of the truth.”348  The court explained that bat-
tles of the experts are commonplace and “tend to show a good faith




342. Reinke, 464 F.3d at 654.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 655 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
345. Id. (quoting Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
346. Id. (quoting Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 668) (internal quotation marks omitted).
347. Id. at 656.
348. Reinke, 464 F.3d at 656 (quoting Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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dispute, not actual malice.”349  Finally, the court found that the
union’s refusal to accept Reinke’s delinquency payment did not
demonstrate actual malice.350  Reinke’s gesture could just as easily be
construed as proof of a guilty conscience as it could be proof of inno-
cence, and the union was not required to give Reinke the benefit of
the doubt.351
Other courts have offered some guidance on what constitutes actual
malice.  In Calop Business Systems v. SEIU, Local 1877,352 the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals determined that making a false statement of
fact upon a mistaken belief of law is negligence at best and insufficient
evidence of actual malice.  In Seven Brothers Painting v. Painters &
Allied Trades District Council Number 2, the court held that the plain-
tiff failed to prove the defendant union acted with actual malice in
sending a defamatory email to the plaintiff’s customers.  The court
noted the importance of timing in determining actual malice. The
presence of actual malice must be measured at the time the defama-
tory statement is made.353 Because the union sent the disparaging
email to the plaintiff’s customers before having knowledge of the fac-
tual inaccuracies of the email’s content, the union could not be found
to have acted with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard
for the truth.354  Courts have also recognized the importance of con-
text in determining whether a statement is made with actual malice.355
In Delaney v. International Union UAW Local Number 94, the Iowa
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to show actual mal-
ice.356  The plaintiff argued that the grammatical tense used in the de-
fendant’s newsletter demonstrated actual malice.357  However, the




352. No. B242073, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4926, at *23–24 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15,
2013).
353. Seven Bros. Painting v. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council No. 2, No. 09-12506, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62540, at *13 (E.D. Mich. June 10, 2011).
354. Id.
355. See, e.g., Point Ruston, LLC v. Pac. Nw. Reg’l Council of the United Bhd. of Carpenters,
No. C09-5232BHS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95239, at *16 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2010).  “The
context in which the [alleged defamatory] statement appears is paramount . . . and in some cases
it can be dispositive. . . . [C]ourts have instructed that the entirety of the context of the statement
must be considered . . . .” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068,
1075 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
356. Delaney v. Int’l Union UAW Local No. 94, 675 N.W.2d 832, 844 (Iowa 2004).
357. Id. at 843.
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“ought not become the grammar police and thereby chill free speech
in this context.”358
Although over forty-five years have passed since the Supreme
Court first applied the Sullivan actual malice standard to labor dis-
putes, courts are still using the test to achieve a balance between pro-
tected speech and the states’ interests in protecting citizens’
reputations.  The inquiry directs attention to the factors that can pro-
vide protection for speech.  Focusing on hatred, personal spite, ill will,
or the desire to injure is unworkable in an environment rife with “bit-
ter and extreme charges, countercharges, unfounded rumors, vituper-
ations, personal accusations, misrepresentations and distortions.”359
While other issues, such as the protection of opinion and rhetorical
hyperbole, sometimes overshadow the analysis, the continued useful-
ness of the standard demonstrates that it does provide the needed
breathing space for communications in labor disputes.
D. Actual Malice and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
Sullivan’s longevity is also reflected in legislation in which Congress
has borrowed the actual malice standard to define the parameters of
lawful behavior.
The use of commercial airlines to attack the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 prompted Congress to enact
the Aviation and Transportation and Security Act (ATSA).360  The
Act created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)361 and
provides immunity from civil liability to any airline employee who
makes “a voluntary disclosure of any suspicious transaction relevant
to a possible violation of law or regulation, relating to air piracy, a
threat to aircraft or passenger safety, or terrorism” to federal, state, or
local law enforcement officials.362  That immunity does not apply,
however, if the disclosure was made with “actual knowledge that the
disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading” or with “reckless disre-
gard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure.”363  Congress took this
358. Id. at 844.
359. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966).  The use of more aggressive
or broadbased tactics by certain labor organizations has made the application of the actual mal-
ice standard difficult. See, e.g., Sutter Health v. Unite Here, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 132, 147 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010) (reversing and remanding so jury could determine whether postcard about health-
care laundries was “an unjustified fabrication based on purposeful avoidance of the truth, rather
than on a mere negligent and inadequate investigation”).
360. 49 U.S.C. §§ 44901–44945 (2012).
361. 49 U.S.C. § 114.
362. 49 U.S.C. § 44941(a).
363. 49 U.S.C. § 44941(b).
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civil liability standard from Sullivan. With the enactment of the
ATSA in 2001, Congress extended the actual malice standard to plain-
tiffs who are private individuals and to situations involving public
safety.
An important question that remained after the enactment of the
ATSA was whether a report of suspicious activities made to the TSA
or other law enforcement officials must be “false” in order to be de-
famatory.  In late January 2014, the Supreme Court concluded in Air
Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper364 that airlines and their employ-
ees are entitled to immunity so long as the disclosure is not “materi-
ally false.”365  The Court also set out a test for determining when such
a statement meets the “materially false” requirement.
1. A Potentially Dangerous Individual?
William Hoeper was a pilot with Air Wisconsin Airlines.366  In 2004,
the airline discontinued use of the type of aircraft he had flown for
many years and required him to become certified on a new airplane
that it was introducing into its fleet.367  Hoeper failed the certification
test on his first three attempts, and his continued employment was at
the airline’s discretion.368  However, the airline agreed to give him one
more opportunity to pass the proficiency test.369
On December 2004, Hoeper had this last opportunity. He failed to
properly deal with a scenario involving engines “flam[ing] out due to a
loss of fuel.”370  When the test instructor told Hoeper that he “should
know better,”371  Hoeper ended the test abruptly, removed his head-
set, threw it at the glare shield, and stated in an angry voice: “This is a
bunch of shit.  I’m sorry.  You are railroading the situation and it’s not
realistic.”372  When Hoeper told the instructor that he wanted to call
the pilot union’s lawyer, the instructor ended the test and reported the
situation to the Air Wisconsin manager of the fleet for which Hoeper
was seeking to become certified.373  The manager then booked a flight
for Hoeper back to Denver, his home base.374
364. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014).
365. Id. at 861.
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Several hours after Hoeper left the Virginia test facility, the Air
Wisconsin fleet manager discussed the situation with the airline’s Vice
President of Operations, the Managing Director of Flight Operations,
and the Assistant Chief Pilot.  The Vice President of Operations ex-
pressed concerns about what Hoeper might do next because he con-
sidered Hoeper’s behavior in the flight simulator to have been “a
fairly significant outburst” of a sort that he “hadn’t seen . . .
before,”375 and knew that Hoeper’s employment with Air Wisconsin
would be terminated as a result of his failure to pass the simulator
test.376
During the discussion, the Managing Director of Flight Operations
mentioned that Hoeper was a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), a
government designation that permits pilots to carry firearms while
performing their duties in order to defend their aircraft against vio-
lence or air piracy.377  While Hoeper was not authorized to carry a
firearm during his trip from Denver to the Virginia training facility
because he was not “engaged in providing air transportation,” the
Denver airport’s security procedures made it possible for
crewmembers to bypass screening, so Hoeper could have brought his
gun with him on the flight.378  The Assistant Chief Pilot later testified
that he was aware of an incident in which an Air Wisconsin pilot had
come to training with his FFDO weapon.379  Based on that informa-
tion, the Vice President of Operations concluded that there was no
way to be certain whether Hoeper was armed, even though he was not
supposed to have his gun with him.380  Finally, the Air Wisconsin offi-
cials discussed two prior episodes in which disgruntled airline employ-
ees had acted violently.381  In light of those considerations, the Vice
President of Operations decided that the airline should inform the
TSA of the situation.382
The Air Wisconsin fleet manager called the TSA and told them that
Hoeper “was an FFDO who may be armed,” that Air Wisconsin was
375. Id. at 858 (alteration in original).
376. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 858 (alteration in original).
377. Id. at 858–59.
378. Id. at 859.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.  In one incident, a flight engineer under investigation for misconduct entered the
cockpit of an aircraft and began attacking the crew with a hammer before he was subdued. Id.
(citing United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1997)).  In another, a recently
terminated ticket agent brought a gun onto an airplane and shot his former supervisor and the
crew, leading to a fatal crash. Id. (citing Eric Malnic, Report Confirms That Gunman Caused
1987 Crash of PSA Jet, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1989, at 29).
382. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 859.
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“concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his fire-
arm,” and that an “[u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program was termi-
nated today.”383  The TSA responded by ordering Hoeper’s plane to
return to the gate in Washington, D.C.384  Officers boarded the plane,
removed Hoeper, searched him, and questioned him about the loca-
tion of his firearm.385  When Hoeper stated that it was at his home in
Denver, a federal agent went there and retrieved it.386  Later that day,
Hoeper was released and permitted to return to Denver.  Air Wiscon-
sin dismissed him the next day.387
2. The Colorado Courts: Rejecting Immunity
Hoeper filed suit against Air Wisconsin in Colorado state court,
making several claims, including defamation.  The case ultimately
went to trial, and the question of the ATSA’s immunity was submitted
to the jury with an instruction that the airline’s immunity would not
apply if Hoeper proved that the Air Wisconsin official made one or
more statements to the TSA with (1) “actual knowledge that the dis-
closure was false, inaccurate, or misleading”; or (2) “reckless disre-
gard as to its truth or falsity.”388
The jury found that the Air Wisconsin fleet manager who called the
TSA made two statements.  First, he stated that Hoeper was an FFDO
who might be armed.  He was traveling to Denver later that day and
Air Wisconsin officials were concerned about his mental stability and
the whereabouts of his firearm.  Second, the Air Wisconsin fleet man-
ager stated that Hoeper was an unstable pilot in the FFDO program
who had been terminated that day.389  The jury returned a verdict for
Hoeper, finding clear and convincing evidence that the two statements
were defamatory, and that the Air Wisconsin manager made one or
both of the statements “knowing that they were false, or so recklessly
as to amount to willful disregard of for the truth.”390  The jury
awarded Hoeper $849,625 in compensatory damages and $391,875 in
punitive damages.  The judge reduced the punitive damages award to
$350,000, for a total judgment of approximately $1.2 million plus





388. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 320 P.3d 830, 835 (Colo. 2012).
389. Id. at 834.
390. Id. at 835.
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costs.391  The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed,392 as did the Colo-
rado Supreme Court.393
3. U.S. Supreme Court’s Analysis and Material Falsity
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
“[w]hether ATSA immunity may be denied without a determination
that the air carrier’s disclosure was materially false.”394  The Court
reversed the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court.  Although the
Justices were unanimous in holding that ATSA immunity cannot be
denied without a finding that the “voluntary disclosure” to law en-
forcement officials was “materially false,” they were split 6–3 as to the
propriety of the Court applying that standard to the facts of the case.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the Court, began by examining
the basis for the exceptions to civil immunity granted by the ATSA to
airline employees who report suspicious activities.395  The Court held
that the ATSA immunity mirrors the actual malice standard fashioned
by the Court in Sullivan.396  It presumed that Congress, in enacting the
ATSA, intended to incorporate the Sullivan meaning of actual malice
into the ATSA.397  Because the Court had long held that actual malice
requires falsity, the majority concluded that Congress intended that an
airline employee who makes a disclosure under the ATSA is not
civilly liable unless the statement is false.398
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Hoeper examined its decision re-
garding material falsity in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine.399  In
Masson,400 the Court discussed whether a statement was materially
391. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 860.
392. Hoeper v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 232 P.3d 230, 248 (Colo. App. 2009).
393. Hoeper, 320 P.3d at 842.




398. Id. at 862.  The Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
described why the actual malice standard was incorporated ATSA:
Incorporation of the actual[ ]malice standard, including its material-falsity requirement,
furthers that design [of encouraging reporting of suspicious activity] in two ways.  First,
by repurposing a preexisting legal framework, Congress reduced the possibility that air-
carrier threat reports would be chilled based on an insufficiently broad scope of protec-
tion or uncertainties as to how the ATSA’s immunity provision would be applied in
practice.  Second, the actual[ ]malice standard has itself evolved to solve precisely the
same problem Congress found in the ATSA: how to give breathing room for useful
speech . . . while preserving the possibility of suits in extreme circumstances.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14, Air Wisconsin
Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014) (No. 12-315).
399. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 861.
400. 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
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false, holding that that “[m]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity
so long as ‘the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge can
be justified.’”401  The Masson Court stated that falsity is determined
by looking at the effect of the statement on the mind of the person
who hears it:  a “statement is not considered false unless it ‘would
have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the
pleaded truth would have produced.’”402  Because Masson had been
in place for over twenty years when Congress enacted the ATSA, Jus-
tice Sotomayor presumed that Congress meant to include the “mate-
rial falsity” requirement when it adopted the actual malice standard
for the ATSA immunity exception.403
The majority also analyzed the concept of material falsity.404  Justice
Sotomayor began by discussing how to determine the “materiality” of
a false statement in the ATSA context.  A statement is materially false
if it “would have a different effect on the mind of the reader [or lis-
tener] from that which the . . . truth would have produced.”405  In the
case of statements made pursuant to the ATSA, the “reader” is not a
member of the public but a TSA officer or some other law enforce-
ment official.  Thus, what does it mean for a statement to produce “a
different effect on the mind of” a security officer from that which the
truth would have produced?  According to Justice Sotomayor, courts
cannot decide whether a false statement produced “a different effect
on the mind of” a hypothetical TSA officer without considering
whether the officer would consider the information important in de-
termining a response to it.406  The TSA analyzes threat reports to de-
termine a proper response to them.  So, even if the Air Wisconsin
401. Id. at 517 (quoting Heuer v. Kee, 59 P.2d 1063, 1064 (1936)).
402. Id. (quoting ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 138 (1980)).
For further discussion of Masson, see LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 3, at 343–48; and SAN-
FORD, supra note 126, at § 1.8.
403. Hoeper, 135 S. Ct. at 861–62.  One of the amici briefs recognized the varied applications
of the actual malice standard that could be impacted by the Colorado Supreme Court holding
that
[i]n addition to providing a baseline protection for speech on matters of public concern,
the actual malice standard has been incorporated by courts in many jurisdictions as a
test for determining when common[ ]law conditional privilege is lost. The Sullivan stan-
dard is also incorporated into numerous other laws, including electoral statutes; trade
libel laws; and a law similar to the ATSA . . . .  Divorcing the falsity requirement from
the constitutional malice standard would impair courts’ analysis of these statutes and
common[ ]law principles as well.
Brief of Amici Curiae for the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et. al. in Support of
Respondent at 27–28, Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014) (No. 12-315)
(citations omitted).
404. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 862.
405. Id. at 864 (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 517) (internal quotation marks omitted).
406. Id. at 861.
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manager’s statement was not entirely accurate, that would not alter
the TSA’s response:  it still would have investigated.407  The state-
ments made to the TSA accurately conveyed the “gist” of what had
occurred, and consequently, the immunity applied.408
A plaintiff seeking to defeat ATSA immunity does not have to show
“precisely what a particular official or federal agency would have done
in a counterfactual scenario.”409  The Court considered such a showing
“impossible . . . given the need to maintain secrecy regarding airline
security operations.”410  A falsehood, however, cannot be material for
purposes of ATSA immunity without “a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable security officer would consider it important in determining
a response to the supposed threat.”411  According to the Court, that
standard “is an objective one, involving the [hypothetical] significance
of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable” security official,
rather than the actual significance of that fact to a particular security
official.412
The opinion also applied the “material falsity” standard to the facts
of the case.413  The majority concluded that even if a jury were to in-
terpret the facts in a way most favorable to Hoeper, Air Wisconsin
was still entitled to ATSA immunity as a matter of law.414  The
Court’s analysis begins with the statement of the Air Wisconsin man-
ager that Hoeper “was an FFDO who may be armed.”415  Hoeper did
not dispute the truth of that statement:  He was an FFDO and, be-
cause FFDOs have firearms, any FFDO “may be armed.”416  Yet,
Hoeper argued that to avoid misinterpretation, the Air Wisconsin
manager should have qualified the statement by adding that he had no
reason to think Hoeper was actually carrying his gun during his trip to
Virginia since he was not permitted to do so under the ATSA.
Although the Court agreed that the Air Wisconsin manager’s state-
ment could have been misinterpreted, it rejected Hoeper’s argument
for two reasons.  First, a reasonable TSA officer, having been told
only that Hoeper was an FFDO and that he was upset about losing his
job, would have wanted to investigate whether Hoeper was carrying
407. Id.
408. Id. at 866.
409. Id. at 864.
410. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 864.
411. Id.




416. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 864.
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his gun.417  Second, to accept Hoeper’s demand for such precise word-
ing would undermine the purpose of ATSA immunity—that is, to en-
courage airlines and their employees, often in situations where there is
little time to fine-tune their report, to provide the TSA with informa-
tion about potential threats immediately.418
The Court then considered the statement of the Air Wisconsin man-
ager that Hoeper “was terminated today.”419  Although, Hoeper had
not yet been discharged when the manager made that statement, it
was widely known that his firing was almost certainly imminent.
Hoeper admitted that his employment was at the airline’s discretion
after his third failed test, and that his agreement with Air Wisconsin
provided that his fourth attempt to pass the certification test would be
his final one.  For the Court, a reasonable TSA officer would not care
whether an angry and potentially armed airline employee had just
been terminated or whether he merely knew the employee was about
to be terminated.420
The court also analyzed how to interpret the statements that
Hoeper was “unstable” and that the Air Wisconsin officials were
“concerned about [his] mental stability.”421  As to this issue, the Court
split 6–3, with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kagan taking the position
that the Court should not decide, as a matter of law, whether the
statements made by the Air Wisconsin fleet manager to the TSA were
materially false.  Instead, they would have remanded the case to give a
jury the opportunity to apply the standard and determine whether the
statements were materially false.422
The majority reasoned that while lawyers and judges sometimes ap-
ply the label “unstable” to people suffering from serious mental ill-
ness, such an interpretation is not the only way in which the term is
used.  For the majority, a holding that Air Wisconsin lost its ATSA
immunity because the fleet manager was not aware of every connota-
tion of the phrase “mental stability” would destroy the immunity
provision.423
417. Id. at 865.
418. Id. (“Baggage handlers, flight attendants, gate agents, and other airline employees who
report suspicious behavior to the TSA should not face financial ruin if, in the heat of a potential
threat, they fail to choose their words with exacting care.”).
419. Id.
420. Id. at 865–66.
421. Id.
422. In a concurring in part, dissenting in part opinion, Justice Scalia dissented from Part III-B
of the majority (applying the material falsity standard to the facts of the case) and the disposi-
tion. Id. at 867–70 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
423. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 866 (majority opinion) (“If such slips of the tongue could give rise
to major financial liability, no airline would contact the TSA (or permit its employees to do so)
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The majority noted that it would be inconsistent with the text and
purpose of the ATSA to expose Air Wisconsin to liability because its
manager could have chosen a slightly better phrase than “mental sta-
bility” to articulate its concern.424  Just as “[m]inor inaccuracies do not
amount to falsity” in the defamation context, the majority held that
“so long as ‘the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be
justified,’” a statement that would otherwise qualify for ATSA immu-
nity does not lose that immunity because of a minor imprecision so
long as “the gist” of the statement is accurate.425  Additionally, the Air
Wisconsin fleet manager’s statements to the TSA accurately conveyed
“the gist” of the situation.  It was irrelevant whether lawyers or judges
might have chosen more precise words.426
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hoeper provided a uniform inter-
pretation of the actual malice standard.  Airline employees who report
suspicious activities to the TSA cannot lose their civil immunity with-
out a showing of actual malice and the “material falsity” of their state-
ments.  In balancing the need to protect individual reputations and
passenger safety, the actual malice standard gives airline employees
broad leeway to report what they believe may be threats to TSA or
other law enforcement officers.  And once again, the standard, uni-
formly interpreted, gives breathing space for communications in the
public interest.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in New York Times v. Sullivan remains one of the
most enduring in the Court’s history.  The reversal of the Alabama
courts not only relieved the newspaper of a potentially devastating
$500,000 judgment, but also assisted the growing civil rights move-
ment by removing the threat of large libel judgments against persons
who spoke out against racial segregation in the South.  In doing so, it
created a jurisprudence that is likely to be widely applied for the next
fifty years.
The actual malice standard derived from the Sullivan Court’s belief
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited.  Erroneous state-
ments are inevitable in such debate, but the Court believed they must
be protected if freedom of expression is to have the “breathing space”
without running by its lawyers the text of its proposed disclosure—exactly the kind of hesitation
that Congress aimed to avoid.”).
424. Id.
425. Id. (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine Inc., 501 US. 496 (1991)).
426. Id.
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necessary to survive.427  Despite inevitable criticism, the history of the
courts’ treatment of defamation cases since 1964 indicates that the
Sullivan standard has produced a rare and continuing consensus
among judges concerning First Amendment protections.
That consensus has permitted the courts to build on what had been
the minority rule among the states in defamation cases, and to create
standards that govern defamation suits brought by “public officials”
and others.  The “breathing space” created by Sullivan has also ex-
tended from the civil rights movement of the late 1950s and early
1960s to investigations and the analysis of situations never envisioned
by Justice Brennan.  From Internet bloggers to union organizers em-
broiled in “labor disputes,” Sullivan’s actual malice standard has been
a bulwark against speech restriction.
And, in the legislative arena, Congress has borrowed the standard
to foster communications about security issues.  The 2001 Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, adopted against the background of
the 9/11 attacks, reflects Congress’ belief that the risk of harm to an
individual’s reputation resulting from an airline employee making an
incorrect disclosure of suspicious activity relating to airline security is
outweighed by the greater risk to aircraft and passenger safety.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s goal of providing “breathing space” for
free debate over public issues has expanded well beyond the founda-
tions of the Sullivan decision and has protected communications on a
wide variety of subjects deemed to be in the public interest.
427. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964).
